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[VOL. 17

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TION DOCTRINE -

CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1871 -

EXHAUS-

EXHAUSTION OF STATE ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

HELD TO BE A PREREQUISITE TO ACCESS TO A FEDERAL FORUM EVEN
THOUGH SUIT WAS BROUGHT PURSUANT TO THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT.

Metcalf v. Swank (7th Cir. 1971)
Plaintiff initiated a class action1 pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of
18712 challenging the constitutionality of an Illinois statute imposing a
1. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for a class action suit if it
meets four specific prerequisites:
(1) [T]he class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,
(2) [T]here are questions of law or fact common to the class,
(3) [T]he claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of
the claims or defenses of the class, and
(4) [TIhe representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
FED. R. Civ. P. 2 3(a).
Having satisfied these prerequisites, the plaintiff must then satisfy any one of
the following three requirements of Rule 23(b) :
(1) [T]he prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members
of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual
members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class
which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests
of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interest; or
(2) [T]he party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the
class as a whole; or
(3) [T]he court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (b).
The named plaintiff in this action represented all those Illinois public assistance recipients who had large families and who lived in inadequate housing costing
more than $90.00 per month. The statute involved makes a broad classification which
covers those persons in need of public assistance. The plaintiff, however, did not
challenge that broad classification but rather the sub-classification which was created
by the inclusion of the shelter allowance maximum of $90.00 per month. See note 3
infra.
For an analysis of the class action suit and rule 23, see generally Kaplan,
Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REv. 356, 375-400 (1967) ; Symposium - The Class
Action, 10 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 497 (1969) ; Note, Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: Rule 23, The Class Action Device And Its Utilization, 22 U. FLA. L. REV.
631 (1970).
2. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1970). Section one of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 provides a private federal remedy
for someone deprived of his federal rights under color of state law. Section one states:
That any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any person

(336)
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maximum shelter allowance of $90.00 per month for those on public
assistance.8 A three-judge district court held the statute constitutional on
its face and remanded the case to a single district judge. 4 Plaintiff filed
an amended complaint,5 challenging the constitutionality of the statute on
its face and as applied, and as violative of state law. The district court
dismissed all of plaintiff's allegations,0 and plaintiff appealed.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower
court's action, holding, inter alia, that it was not a proper case in which
to make an exception to the usual requirement necessitating plaintiff's
exhaustion of state administrative remedies before proceeding into a
federal forum.7 Metcalf v. Swank, 444 F.2d 1353 (7th Cir. 1971).
The Civil Rights Act of 1871 created a civil action for damages and
equitable relief against any person acting "under color of" state law
who deprives another of the rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution or federal laws." The Civil Rights Acts, 9 promulgated in
within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States, shall,
any such law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the State to the
contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the party injured in any action at law, suit
in equity or other property proceeding for redress ...

17 Stat. 13.
Named as defendants were the directors of the Department of Public Aid who
were charged with the enforcement of the Illinois Public Aid Code. The plaintiff
alleged that the statute was unreasonable and arbitrary, thereby violating the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Therefore, as provided for in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, the defendant directors in the discharge of their duties and acting under color
of state law were sued. The defendants were clearly within the purview of the statute.
In the landmark decisions of United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941), and
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), both cases involving 18 U.S.C. § 242,
the criminal counterpart to section 1983, the Supreme Court held that those conferred with power by virtue of a state law, or clothed with the authority of state law
were acting "under color of" law as necessitated by the statute.
3. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 12-4.11 (1967). The statute refers to the public
assistance shelter allowance and provides:
The shelter standard for any recipient, exclusive of household furnishings and
utilities, shall not exceed $90.00 per month, except for adjustments made in the
manner authorized by § 12-14.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 12-14 (1967), provides that the Illinois Department
of Public Aid may, after consultation with the Legislative Advisory Committee on
Public Aid, authorize exceptions from the $90.00 limitation.
4. Metcalf v. Swank, 293 F. Supp. 268 (N.D. Ill. 1968). The court held that
due to the statutory provisions for exceptions to the $90.00 maximum on the basis of
need, and in accord with the stated purposes of the Public Aid Code, the statute is
constitutional on its face. See note 3 supra.
5. Count I of the amended complaint renewed the constitutional challenge to the
statute on its face. Count II challenged the application of the statutory provisions, and
Count III challenged the provisions on state law grounds. Metcalf v. Swank,
444 F.2d 1353, 1355 (7th Cir. 1971).
6. Metcalf v. Swank, 305 F. Supp. 785, 791 (N.D. Ill. 1969). The district court
dismissed Count I as already ruled on by the three-judge court; Count II was dismissed for failure to exhaust state administrative remedies; and Count III was dismissed due to lack of pendent jurisdiction following dismissal of Count II.
7. 444 F.2d at 1359. In addition, the court held that it was proper to dismiss for
plaintiff's failure to state a cause of action.
8. See note 2 supra.
9. The Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27 (parts codified in 18 U.S.C. § 242,
28 U.S.C. § 1443(1), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982) ; The Enforcement Act, 16 Stat. 140
(1870) (parts codified in 18 U.S.C. § 241) ; the amendments to the Enforcement Act,

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol17/iss2/5

2

Editors: Recent Developments

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 17

response to the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, were
originally designed to guarantee certain fundamental rights to the emancipated Negro.' 0 Only section one of the 1871 Act achieved any success
in subsequent years, and that success has been only recently apparent."
Generally, in order to proceed into a federal forum and regardless of
whether the suit is pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, it has been consistently held that the plaintiff must first exhaust his administrative
remedies. 12 Attempts to circumvent the rigidity of the exhaustion doctrine1 8 have produced several exceptions. 14 One such exception states
that if there is no administrative remedy available, then the exhaustion
doctrine is inapplicable.' 5 Other courts have held that if, in pursuing an
administrative remedy, it appears that such pursuit is futile, then exhaus16 Stat. 433 (1871) ; Civil Rights Act of April 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13 (parts codified
in 10 U.S.C. § 1033, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3)).
10. All of these amendments contained clauses giving Congress the power to pass
legislation in support of their policy. In response, Congress passed the Civil Rights

Acts. See note 9 supra.
11. See Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1871: Continuing Vitality, 40 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 70, 71 (1964). In this note, the author points out that the Supreme Court effectively limited the purposes of the post-Civil War amendments and legislation by the
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), and the case of United States v. Cruikshank,
92 U.S. 542 (1875), where it was held that the amendments were directed only against
"state action" rather than against action by private individuals. In a series
of Supreme
Court cases, Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), United States v. Classic,
313 U.S. 299 (1941), and Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939), the Court broadened
the application of section 1983 and its criminal counterpart section 242, and concluded
that one having authority of state law and subsequently misusing that power is acting
"under color of" state law and within the meaning of the statute. These cases
permitted greater acceptance of section 1983, and this acceptance was "evidenced by the
scores of claims appearing in the federal courts during the 1950's." Note, supra
at 71-72. See generally Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation,
50 MICH. L. REV. 1323 (1952).
12. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbldg. Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938). In Myers,
the Court stated that "no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened
injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted." See Natural
Gas Pipeline v. Slattery, 302 U.S. 300, 310-11 (1937). One reason given in support of
the exhaustion doctrine is that it should be viewed as part of the comity doctrine.
See Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908).
13. The exhaustion doctrine requires a plaintiff to exhaust all state remedies
before proceeding into a federal forum. This doctrine should not be confused with
the abstention doctrine whereby a federal court may decide not to hear a particular
case even though it has jurisdiction. The abstention doctrine is usually invoked to:
(1) avoid decision of a federal constitutional question of state law; (2) avoid needless entanglement in complex state regulatory schemes; and (3) allow the state
courts an opportunity to give constitutionally questionable statutes saving constructions
when such state remedy is available. For a thorough analysis of the abstention doctrine, see Wright, The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37 TEXAS L. REV. 815
(1959); Note, Federal-Question Abstention: Justice Frankfurter's Doctrine In An
Activist Era, 80 HARV. L. REV. 604 (1967).
14. See State Corp. Comm'n v. Wichita Gas Co., 290 U.S. 561 (1934) (held that
it was not necessary to seek judicial review in state court of an order by a state
public service commission before proceeding into federal court) ; March v. School Bd.,
305 F.2d 94, 98-99 (4th Cir. 1962) ; Farley v. Turner, 281 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1960)
(held, with respect to school desegregation question, that since the available administrative remedy was inadequate, it was unnecessary to exhaust prior to action in federal
forum) ; Kelly v. Board of Educ., 159 F. Supp. 272 (M.D. Tenn. 1958) (held that
exhaustion doctrine is inapplicable if there is no adequate administrative remedy).
See also 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 20.07, at 663-64 (Supp. 1970);
L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 446-49 (1965).
15. E.g., State Corp. Comm'n v. Wichita Gas Co., 290 U.S. 561 (1934).
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tion will not be required before access to a federal forum will be permitted. 16 For purposes of discussion in connection with the instant case,
however, the focus is not on the broad classification of the exhaustion
doctrine, but rather on a sub-classification within that doctrine; namely,
the requirement that one exhaust state administrative remedies before
proceeding into a federal forum.
The pervasiveness of the exhaustion of state remedies doctrine, as
applied to cases under the Civil Rights Act, has been seriously challenged
only within the last ten years.' 7 The first case seemingly to break with
the established rule was Monroe v. Pape,' in which the Supreme Court
held that the Civil Rights Act gave the plaintiff a right of immediate
access to a federal forum, regardless of any available state remedies. 19
The Court stated that "[t] he federal remedy is supplementary to the state
remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the
federal one is invoked. '20 Two years later in McNeese v. Board of
Education,21 the Court, quoting from Stapelton v. Mitchell,22 said:
We yet like to believe that wherever the Federal courts sit, human
rights under the Federal Constitution are always a proper subject for
adjudication, and that we have not the right to decline the exercise
of that jurisdiction simply because
the rights asserted may be adjudi23
cated in some other forum.
Monroe and McNeese did not, however, settle the question of exhaustion.
Even after those decisions, while some courts interpreted them as extinguishing the remaining vitality of the exhaustive doctrine under the Civil
16. E.g., March v. School Bd., 305 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1962).
17. Since 1961, when the Supreme Court decided Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961), there has been a series of Supreme Court cases which could lead to the conclusion that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is no longer necessary for
suits pursuant to the Civil Rights Act. See Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968)
(per curiam) (prisoners' rights) ; King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (substitute
father regulation) ; Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967) (per curiam) (welfare
rights) ; McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963) (school segregation). See
notes 18, 21, 26, 27 & 28 infra.
18. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). The Monroe Court, reversing the lower court's dismissal of petitioner's complaint, held that a complaint alleging an illegal search and
detention of petitioner by the Chicago police force was sufficient to maintain a cause
of action under section 1983.
19. 365 U.S. at 183.
20. Id.
21. 373 U.S. 668 (1963). The lower court had dismissed petitioner's complaint,
which alleged segregation in an Illinois public school, due to the failure of petitioner
to exhaust available state administrative remedies. However, the administrative officers
were only empowered to recommend the institution of state judicial proceedings, and
a full litigation would be necessary for enforcement if the recommendation were not
followed. The Court cited Monroe for the proposition that "relief under the Civil
Rights Act may not be defeated because relief was not first sought under state law
which provided a remedy." Id. at 671.
22. 60 F. Supp. 51 (D. Kan. 1945). The Stapelton court held that an action to
enjoin the enforcement of the 1943 Kansas Labor Law as interfering with free
speech, press and assembly was within the original jurisdiction of the federal court
under the Civil Rights Act.
23. 373 U.S. at 674, quoting Stapelton v. Mitchell, 60 F. Supp. 51, 55 (D.
Kan. 1945).
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Rights Act, 24 others did not interpret them to go so far. 25 When the

exhaustion question arose again in 1967, the Court, in Damico v. California,26 summarily rejected the exhaustion requirement, citing Monroe
and McNeese as controlling. Similarily, in King v. Smith 7 and Houghton
v. Shafer,25 the Court reached the decision that exhaustion was not
24. Most courts, when faced with the issue of exhaustion, have interpreted Monroe
and McNeese as doing away with any vitality of the exhaustion doctrine as it relates
to the Civil Rights Act. See, e.g., School Bd. v. Barksdale, 348 F.2d 261 (1st Cir.
1965) (dictum) ; Powell v. Workmen's Compensation Bd., 327 F.2d 131, 135 (2d
Cir. 1964); Lee v. Hodges, 321 F.2d 480, 484 (4th Cir. 1963); Clutchette v.
Procunier,
F. Supp.
(N.D. Cal. 1971) (dictum) ; Kronlund v. Honstein, 327
F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Payne v. Whitmore, 325 F. Supp. 1191 (N.D. Cal.
1971) ; Phipps v. McGinnis, 327 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) ; Ferrel v. School Dist.,
261 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. Tex. 1966); Scolnick v. Winston, 219 F. Supp. 836, 839
(S.D.N.Y. 1963) (dictum).
25. Some courts have viewed Monroe and McNeese as not laying down a broad
principle including all areas of Civil Rights litigation. See, e.g., Wright v. McMann,
257 F. Supp. 739 (N.D.N.Y. 1966) (elimination of exhaustion requirement limited to
school segregation cases), rev'd on other grounds, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967) (the
state remedy was inadequate). Other courts have determined that the Monroe and
McNeese decisions are applicable only where the state remedies were inadequate. See,
e.g., Toney v. Reagan, 326 F. Supp. 1093 (N.D. Cal. 1971), where the court held
that a state administrative remedy which purports to provide relief for an already
accomplished deprivation of civil rights need not be pursued before resort to the
federal courts is permitted. However, a state administrative procedure which is
designed to forestall a threatened deprivation of civil rights, for example a grievance
procedure, must be exhausted before resorting to the federal courts under the Civil
Rights Act, provided only that the grievance procedure is fair and adequate for the
purpose. See also Dale Book Co. v. Leary, 389 F.2d 40, 42 (3d Cir. 1968) (dictum) ;
Potwora v. Dillon, 386 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1967) (dictum) ; Birnbaum v. Trussell, 371
F.2d 672, 680 (2d Cir. 1966) (Hays, J., concurring); Christmas v. Board of Educ.,
231 F. Supp. 331, 339 (D. Md. 1964). See generally K. DAVIS, supra note 14,
at 663-64.
26. 389 U.S. 416 (1967). Damico involved a suit by welfare recipients challenging
a provision under the California Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program
requiring a three-month waiting period after the father's desertion before benefits
could be received. The lower court dismissed the complaint on the basis that the
plaintiffs had failed to exhaust adequate state administrative remedies. In a threeparagraph opinion, the Supreme Court reversed and summarily rejected the requirement to exhaust. The Court stated:
The three-judge District Court dismissed the complaint solely because 'it appear(ed) to the Court that all of the plaintiffs (had) failed to exhaust adequate
administrative remedies.' This was error. In McNeese . . . , noting that one of
the purposes underlying the Civil Rights Act was 'to provide a remedy in the
federal courts supplementary to any remedy any State might have,' . . . we held
that 'relief under the Civil Rights Act may not be defeated because relief was
not first sought under state law which provided (an administrative) remedy.'
Id. at 416-17 (citations omitted; parentheses appear in original).
27. 392 U.S. 309 (1968). King was a class action suit by claimants under the
Alabama Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program (AFDC) challenging
the constitutionality of the Alabama "substitute father" regulation denying AFDC
payments to the children of a mother who "cohabits" in or outside her home with an
able-bodied man. The Court stated:
We reject appellants' argument that appellees were required to exhaust their
administrative remedies prior to bringing this action. . . . Decisions of this
Court . . . establish that a plaintiff in an action brought under the Civil Rights
Act . . . is not required to exhaust administrative remedies, where the constitutional challenge is sufficiently substantial, as here, to require the convening of a
three-judge court ....
Id. at 312 n.4 (citations omitted).
28. 392 U.S. 639 (1968). Houghton was an action brought by a Pennsylvania
state prisoner claiming that prison authorities had violated his rights under section one
of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 by depriving him of his legal materials. The district
court dismissed the complaint on the ground that petitioner had not exhausted certain
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required. The King Court noted that prior decisions of the Supreme
Court have established that a plaintiff in an action brought under the Civil
Rights Act is not required to exhaust his administrative remedies, at
least where the constitutional challenge is sufficiently substantial to require the convening of a three-judge court. 29 In Houghton, the Court
reasoned that resort to these administrative remedies is unnecessary in
light of its decisions in Monroe, McNeese, and Damico.8 0 In spite of the
broad interpretation given these Supreme Court decisions by some courts,81
the remaining vitality of the exhaution doctrine under the Civil Rights
32
Act remains unclear.
In analyzing the question of exhaustion in the instant case, the
Metcalf court did not find a complete abrogation of the exhaustion requirement in Civil Rights Act cases, but rather found "only a pattern of
flexibility in imposing the exhaustion requirement in this special area." 38
To support the contention that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is no longer required for suits properly brought under the Civil
Rights Act, plaintiff relied on a series of Supreme Court cases 34 which
she argued clearly established that the exhaustion doctrine has been abandoned in the special area of civil rights. The court, however, refused to
follow plaintiff's rationale, but found that the cases relied on presented
distinct factual situations which were incapable of being interpreted to
establish any broad principle eliminating the exhaustion requirement under
35
the Civil Rights Act.
In refusing to grant plaintiff's requests, the Seventh Circuit distinguished individually each of the cases upon which the plaintiff placed her
reliance. The court stated that Monroe and McNeese were merely restatements of the generally accepted rule which provides that the exhaustion
state administrative remedies. In a per curiam opinion, the Court reversed, holding
that it was not necessary for petitioner to have resorted to those state remedies.
Id. at 640.
29. 392 U.S. at 312 n.4.

30. 392 U.S. at 640.
31. See note 24 supra.
32. See notes 24 & 25 supra.
33. 444 F.2d at 1356.
34. The cases relied on by plaintiff were: Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639
(1968); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416
(1967)
McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963); Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167 (1961).
35. 444 F.2d at 1356.
Actions under the Civil Rights Act generally are of a very grave concern in
that they are charging a violation of one's constitutional rights due to some action
either by the state or under the authority of the state. Since the protection of one's
constitutional rights is held sacred to a greater extent than any other rights in our
society, making an exception to the exhaustion doctrine in this special area is understandable. When the nature of the rights involved in a civil rights action are combined with the procedural aspects of a class action, as was present in the instant suit,
it can be easily seen that this area might indeed deserve special attention. Coupling
these elements presents a strong policy argument whereby a court might consider
circumventing or eliminating the requirement of exhaustion when a constitutional
infringement is alleged.
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doctrine does not apply when dealing with state judicial remedies. 6 In
Monroe, the available remedies were judicial8 7 and the Metcalf court
determined that when Monroe stated that the federal remedy was supplemental to that of the state, it referred to state judicial remedies alone."
In similar fashion, the court distinguished McNeese. The Metcalf court
reasoned that while the remedy in McNeese was administrative in form,
it was judicial in practice since the only action the administrator could
take was to recommend the institution of state court proceedings.8 9 Thus,
the Metcalf court found no persuasiveness in the first two cases upon
which the plaintiff relied.
The interpretation afforded to Monroe and McNeese is in keeping
with the general hesitancy of courts to circumvent the exhaustion doctrine. 40 It is possible, however, to validly reach a different conclusion in
36. 444 F.2d at 1356-58. Most courts are willing to circumvent the usual exhaustion
doctrine if the statute provides remedies of a state judicial nature. Compare Prentis
v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908) (remedy was considered administrative and exhaustion was required), with Bacon v. Rutland R.R., 232 U.S. 134
(1914) (remedy was judicial and exhaustion was not required).
37. In Monroe, the violation occurred due to illegal actions of the Chicago police
and there was no administrative remedy available. To obtain relief at the state level,
the plaintiff would have had to seek state judicial remedies.
38. 444 F.2d at 1355.
39. Id. The available administrative remedy in McNeese was as follows:
Fifty residents of a school district, or 10 per cent whichever was less, could
file a complaint with the Superintendent of Public Institutions alleging racial segregation. The superintendent would then list the complaint for a hearing. If he then
decided that the allegations were "substantially" accurate, he could request the Illinois
Attorney General to bring suit in a state court. Apparently, the Metcalf court maintained that even if the Attorney General were to comply with the request, the true
remedy would be judicial and not administrative in nature. Therefore, the Metcalf
court determined that McNeese was only an extension of the non-exhaustion doctrine
in cases involving judicial remedies. It should be noted, however, that if the superintendent determined that the complaint was not substantially accurate, then the
plaintiff would have exhausted the available administrative remedies and would be
able to bring suit in a federal forum. It is suggested that this leads to an impractical
dichotomy. If one were to follow the Metcalf court's reasoning, it would seem that
when the superintendent rules in favor of the complainant, the remedy is judicial, but
if he rules against the complainant, then the remedy is administrative. Consequently,
if the remedy is judicial, exhaustion would not be necessary; but if it is administrative,
then exhaustion will be required. Since a plaintiff in the facts given in McNeese
could not know beforehand how the superintendent would rule, there is no way to
determine whether he is pursuing a judicial or an administrative remedy, and therefore no way to determine whether he must follow that route at all.
40. The exhaustion doctrine has been applied most often whenever a plaintiff is
seeking equitable relief by way of an injunction. See, e.g., Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbldg. Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938). But the Myers court also held that since the rule
is one of judicial interpretation, it may be applied to suits at law in addition to suits
in equity. Generally, the doctrine is said to apply whenever a statute provides for
administrative relief and makes the resort to its remedies paramount to seeking relief
in the courts. See United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161 (1904). The exhaustion
doctrine is sometimes limited if the statute gives an election between using the
administrative remedy and seeking immediate relief in the courts. See Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 235 (1931). The general policy rationale in support
of the doctrine favors the orderly procedure whereby the administrative agencies can
decide the problems and avoid a flood of litigation in the courts. See United States v.
Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161 (1904). The basis for this policy is the belief that the
administrative agency will decide the matter correctly and quickly if given the opportunity to do so. See Public Welfare Comm'n v. State, 187 Okla. 654, 105
P.2d 547 (1940). There is, therefore, a general reluctance on the part of state or
federal courts to hear a case unless the administrative remedy has been utilized. It is
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viewing these decisions. The McNeese court spoke in broad language and
indicated that "relief under the Civil Rights Act may not be defeated
because relief was not first sought under state law which provided a
remedy."41 Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority in McNeese and
quoting from Monroe, reiterated the Court's position that a federal remedy
is only supplementary to that of the state; the latter need not be first
sought and refused before the former may be invoked.4 2 The Metcalf
analysis that this language referred only to state judicial remedies or
those of a judicial nature is further weakened by the Court's statement
in McNeese which outlined the "three main aims" of section 1983:
[T]o override certain kinds of state laws, to provide a remedy where
state law was inadequate, "to provide a federal remedy where the
state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not available in practice"

. . .

and to provide a remedy in the federal courts supplementary

to any remedy any State might have . .

.4

In light of this language, it is possible to conclude that the Court in
Monroe and McNeese proposed that exhaustion of any state remedies,
whether judicial or administrative, is not required for suits brought under
the Civil Rights Act.
Further, to support its contention that McNeese was distinguishable
on its facts, the Seventh Circuit might have referred to the McNeese
Court's doubt that the remedy available was sufficient. 4 4 The broad
language of the McNeese opinion is narrowed by Mr. Justice Douglas'
remarks regarding the "tenuous" nature of the available administrative protection. 45 Justice Douglas concluded his analysis by stating that
when the adequacy of the available remedy is questionable, "prior
resort to a state proceeding is not necessary . . . ,,46 It might therefore
be implied that the McNeese opinion referred only to the singular set of
circumstances presented for its consideration. Indeed, the instant court
could have combined that analysis with its treatment of Houghton v.
Shafer.47 The Metcalf court viewed Houghton as inapposite since any
exhaustion there would merely have entailed an appeal to an administrator
who had already established his position that the rules challenged "were
validly and correctly applied to petitioner . . . ,,48 The court concluded
not surprising, in light of this policy, for the Metcalf court to search for a method of
retaining the doctrine in the instant case.
41. 373 U.S. at 671 (emphasis added).
42. Id., quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961).
43. Id. at 672 (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 674-75.
45. Id. at 676.
46. Id.

47. 392 U.S. 639 (1968).
48. Id. at 640. The complaint in Houghton concerned prison rules that the attorney general of the state submitted had been "validly and correctly applied to
petitioner." To require the petitioner to resort to an administrative remedy ending
with an appeal to that very officer "would be to demand a futile act." Id.
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that Houghton was "no more than a particular application of the general
rule that there is no requirement to exhaust inadequate administrative
remedies. ' 49 By so combining Houghton and McNeese, the court could
more easily have limited the McNeese decision to its facts and, thus,
would have strengthened its interpretation of Houghton. Were it not for
other precedent ° relied upon by plaintiff, this analysis would seem to
be sufficient.
51
The language employed by the Court in Damico v. California brings
into question the Metcalf court's interpretation of the adequacy requirement. The Damico Court stated:
The three-judge District Court dismissed the complaint solely because "it appear[ed] to the Court that all of the plaintiffs (had)52
failed to exhaust adequate administrative remedies." This was error.
In broad language, Damico thus indicated that even if there is an adequate
administrative remedy, exhaustion will not be required in a suit pursuant
58
to the Civil Rights Act.

Metcalf, however, distinguished Damico. By examining the combined effect of Damico and King v. Smith,5 4 both suits in which a state
statute or regulation was challenged as unconstitutional on its face and
both involving purely administrative and not judicial remedies, the Metcalf
court found that "since the administrative remedy [there] cannot resolve
the constitutional challenge, exhaustion will not be required unless the
administrative action might make judicial determination of the constitutional question unnecessary .

.

.

. -55

Thus, what the court in Metcalf

proposed was an exclusion of the exhaustion requirement in cases combining the following elements: (1) a non-frivolous constitutional challenge
of a statute on its face; (2) the general inadequacy of administrative
remedies to deal with such challenges; and (3) the special federal nature
of actions under the Civil Rights Act.56 The court's treatment of Damico
and King in connection with the interpretation given the Monroe and
MeNeese decisions supports its adoption of the following rule:
Exhaustion is not required where the remedies are judicial or where a
statute or regulation is attacked on its face as unconstitutional; however, exhaustion is to be required where the remedies are administra49. 444 F.2d at 1356.
50. Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967).
51. 389 U.S. 416 (1967).
52. Id. at 416-17 (emphasis added; parentheses appear in original).
53. Any reliance, therefore, upon the adequacy of the remedy as a reason for
requiring exhaustion would seem to be nullified by the language used in Damico. As
a result of the Damico opinion, it no longer appears necessary to consider the adequacy
of the remedy when facing the issue of exhaustion if the suit is pursuant to the Civil
Rights Act.
54. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
55. 444 F.2d at 1356.
56. Id.
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[or] regulation . . . is attacked as unconstitutive and the statute
57
tional as applied.

The court's ruling as it pertains to judicial remedies is well founded.
Even before the series of Supreme Court cases,58 many courts held that
exhaustion of state judicial remedies was not required. 59 That part of
the court's rule, therefore, is not new. What Metcalf has added to the
distinction regarding the judicial as opposed to administrative nature of
a remedy is a further distinction regarding the form of the attack. If
the attack is against the statute or regulation as applied, then the court
would hold that the plaintiff is required to have exhausted his administrative state remedies; but, if the attack is against the statutue or regulation on its face, then exhaustion will not be required. It is understandable
that if a statute is being challenged as unconstitutional as applied, the
courts will be more likely to require exhaustion since there is a chance
that action by the administrative agency may correct the problem. However, when a statute is challenged as unconstitutional on its face, it is virtually impossible for the agency to save the statute if the allegations are
true, and it is apparent that no agency action could further clarify the issue.
Therefore, courts are understandably less likely to require exhaustion in
the latter instance. The Metcalf court relied primarily on King and
Damico, where a statute or regulation was attacked as being unconstitutional on its face, for support of its form distinction. Since the plaintiff
in Metcalf had already had a determination of the "on its face" issue
and was then challenging the application of the statute,60 the instant court
determined that King and Damico were inapposite. 61
In further support for its "as-applied" versus "facial attack" formula,
the Metcalf court relied heavily on the consideration of whether the
available state administrative remedies would be adequate.6 2 The court
implied that when the attack, as in the instant case, is "as-applied," the
available administrative remedies are fully adequate.63 Metcalf further
stated that "all of the alleged faults cited by plaintiffs as depriving them
of federal rights are either correctable through the unexplored avenues
of administrative appeal provided by the Illinois statute or are plainly
frivolous.

' 64

The plaintiff contended, however, that to require the ex-

57. Id. at 1361 (dissenting opinion).
58. See note 17 stepra.
59. See note 14 supra. Generally, the reason given for not requiring a plaintiff to
exhaust his state judicial remedies when alleging a violation of rights secured by the
federal Constitution is that he is entitled to expect a decision regarding his constitutional rights to be adjudicated in the courts of the United States rather than in those
of a state. See, e.g., Railroad & Warehouse Comm'n v. Duluth St. Ry., 273 U.S.
625 (1927).
60. 444 F.2d at 1356.
61. Id.
62. Id.

63. Id.
64. Id. at 1358.
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haustion of administrative appeals would result in admininstrative chaos
due to the inherent nature of a class action. The court put aside this
argument by requiring only the named plaintiff to exhaust and not the
entire class. 65 By so holding, the court necessarily raised the question
whether an administrative remedy can ever be adequate in such a class
action. It is logically permissible to conclude that administrative remedies
in such a situation can never be adequate. Even if the named plaintiff did
exhaust, it is difficult to see how such an exhaustion could resolve the
constitutional claims of the entire class. One commentator, considering
the exhaustion requirement in relation to class actions brought under the
Civil Rights Act, has suggested:
[I] f the plaintiff is required to proceed first through the state agency,
there is a danger that the agency proceedings will terminate in an
individual settlement which satisfies the complaint, but neither changes
the rule nor subjects it to external scrutiny. Where this happens,
others who, because of fear, ignorance, or lack of resources, fail to
mount challenges of their own, continue to be governed by a rule of
questionable constitutionality. 6
It is suggested that if any distinction regarding the form of the
action and the adequacy of the state remedies is to be made, it might
indeed be more pragmatic to make the distinction in terms of whether an
individual grievance or that of the constitutional claims of a class is
involved.67 It is a definite possibility that if one is in a jurisdiction
following the Seventh Circuit and requiring exhaustion, ability to challenge
the unconstitutionality of a statute as applied in a class action suit would
be diminished. In those jurisdictions, if the administrative agency, when
65. Id.

66. Comment, Exhaustion of State Remedies Under the Civil Rights Act, 68
COLUM. L. REV. 1201, 1208 (1968). For a thorough analysis of the exhaustion doctrine, see Chevigny, Section 1983 Jurisdiction: A Reply, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1352
(1970) ; Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82
HARV. L. REV. 1486 (1969). See also Note, FederalJudicial Review of State Welfare

Practices, 67 CoLum. L.

REV.

84 (1967) ; Note, The Proper Scope of the Civil Rights

Act, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (1953) ; Note, The Civil Rights Act: Emergence of an
Adequate Federal Civil Remedy?, 26 IND. L.J. 361 (1951) ; Note, supra note 11.
67. The Metcalf court takes its form argument even further. The court determined that when the plaintiffs first came before the three-judge court the sole question at that time was the constitutionality of the statute on its face; exhaustion was
not appropriate since it is doubtful whether the administrative agency could resolve
the constitutional issue. The court also reasoned that after the decision of the threejudge court, the sole question was the constitutionality of the statute as applied;
exhaustion became appropriate since it might be possible for agency action to save
the statute. In maintaining this proposition in practice, it would mean that a court

would be required to dismiss a plaintiff who had not previously exhausted and who was
attacking a statute both "on its face" and "as applied" if the court first determined
that there was no constitutional problem regarding the "on its face" issue. Such an
application would lead only to undue loss of time and expenditure. A better approach

might be to either require exhaustion at all times, regardless of the form of attack,

or make a different "form" distinction based upon the nature of the action, as for
example a class action, which would not cause such practical problems. Alternatively,
a more liberal approach would be to abandon the exhaustion requirement completely in
cases raising constitutional issues under the Civil Rights Act.
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hearing the complaint, is attuned to the potential occurrence of a class
action suit, it can easily grant the requested exceptions and satisfy the
immediate complaint, thereby eliminating the possibility of a class action.
It is then only a matter of outlasting the funds and patience of the attorneys representing those clients (invariably indigents or near-indigents),
thus saving what still might be an unconstitutional statute or procedure.
Another factor in the instant case creates additional doubt whether
the available administrative remedies were adequate. Requiring the plaintiff to exhaust at this point in time raises the further question whether
he would now be permitted to do so under the state statute. The statute
permits appeals to be taken within sixty days of an adverse agency
determination." Since the decision was originally handed down in 1968,
it is probable that no appeal can now be taken. 69 Any inability now to
appeal could be attributed to attorney error in not foreseeing the necessity
to exhaust in the first instance. To make such a determination, however,
would be unnecessarily harsh; in the past, the Seventh Circuit's position
with respect to the exhaustion problem has not been entirely clear. The
same court in Elmwood Properties, Inc. v. Conzelman7 ° stated that exhaustion of state remedies is not required before bringing suit in federal
court for deprivation of civil rights. 71 The Elmwood court made an
exception only by saying that if "an exhaustion of remedies will eliminate
any possible constitutional problem, then that route [exhaustion] should
be followed. '7 2 As previously mentioned, it is not clear in a class action
welfare suit as the instant case, whether resort to administrative remedies
could resolve the constitutional claim of the class. The court in Elmwood
68. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 11-8 (1967), provides that the appeal may be taken
within sixty days after a decision is rendered, or if the department fails to act
promptly on an application, thirty days after it is filed. An appealed decision must be
reviewed and the appellant is entitled to appear in person, to be represented by
counsel, and to present all relevant matter in support of the claim. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 23, § 11-8.1 (1967). Generally, a decision must be rendered within sixty days
of the filing of the appeal. Judicial review of adverse administrative action is also
available. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 264 et seq. (1967).

69. If any appeal can now be taken, it would probably be only at the discretion
named plaintiff, it is highly improbable that this would solve the problems of the
entire cass.
The Metcalf court, in keeping with its view that exhaustion was necessary,
might have directed in its opinion that the administrative agency should now hear
the plaintiff's case notwithstanding the sixty-day appeal limit imposed by the statute.
The effect of its decision as given, however, is a dismissal of plaintiff's action.
70. 418 F.2d 1025 (7th Cir. 1969). In Elmwood, property owners brought suit
under the Civil Rights Act, alleging that they were denied due process by being
refused a building permit after the housing inspector sent notice that repairs were
required or the buildings would be destroyed. The court stated that an exhaustion of
state remedies is not required unless that exhaustion would eliminate any possible
constitutional problem. Id. at 1027.
71. Id. at 1027.
72. Id.

of the administrative agency. But even if the agency were to grant the appeal of the
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cited Basista v. Weir 73 as authority. The Basista court not only stated
that exhaustion of state remedies is not required before proceeding in
a federal court, but that it is not even necessary to use the remedies
concurrently.74 It does not seem equitable, therefore, to punish the instant
plaintiff for failure to exhaust when it was not at all clear when the suit
was commenced that such exhaustion was necessary. Even if the Metcalf
court felt that under the circumstances of the present case exhaustion
will normally be required, an exception should have been made based
purely upon the instant facts.
The importance of the Metcalf decision is not in its seemingly
new articulation of the exhaustion doctrine in Civil Rights cases, but
rather in that it required exhaustion at all. Many courts have interpreted
the line of Supreme Court cases differently than Metcalf.7 5 In Clutchette
v. Procunier,76 the district court, feeling that there was no longer any
doubt regarding the doctrine of exhaustion under the Civil Rights Act,
stated :
[T] he Supreme Court laid to rest any doubt that might have remained
regarding the vitality of the exhaustion doctrine in actions brought
under the Civil Rights Act. Monroe v. Pape .

.

. actually established

but it took McNeese to seal the lid on
this position two years prior
77
the coffin of exhaustion.
Contrary to Clutchette's pronouncement, it is clear that the doctrine of
exhaustion under the Civil Rights Act retains vitality, and is not a
settled issue.
78
Mr. Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion in Younger v. Harris,
maintains that there should be an absolute exception to the exhaustion of
73. 225 F. Supp. 619 (W.D. Pa. 1964). Basista involved an action under the Civil
Rights Act against an arresting police officer and others as a result of plaintiff's arrest
and confinement.
74. Id. at 625.
75. See note 24 supra.
76......-F. Supp.
(N.D. Cal. 1971).
77. Id. at -- (emphasis added). In concluding its position with respect to the
exhaustion doctrine, the Clutchette court referred to the extensive number of prisoners'
rights cases which have been brought pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, and the willingness on the part of federal courts to hear such suits. The court determined:
[I]t would be unwise and inappropriate for this court to return to a doctrine
designed to promote harmonious relations between sovereigns, at the expense of
the timely adjudication of human rights.
Id. at -..........
78. 401 U.S. 37, 58 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting). In Younger, plaintiff was
indicted for violation of the California Criminal Syndicalism Act. He sought an
injunction against the district attorney, alleging the prosecution and mere presence of
the Act inhibited him in the exercise of his free speech and press. A three-judge
court, finding the Act void for vagueness and overbreadth and thereby violative of the
first and fourteenth amendments, issued an injunction. The Supreme Court reversed,
holding the action to be a violation of the national policy forbidding a federal court
from staying or enjoining pending state court proceedings except under special circumstances. Id. at 43-54.
Mr. Justice Douglas, in his dissent, cited McNeese for the proposition that
the Court has already held that section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state
remedies. Id. at 62 n.5.
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state remedies requirement when suits are brought pursuant to the Civil
Rights Act. 79 This absolute exception increases in persuasiveness when
it is realized that Congress has charged the federal judiciary with a
"special vigilance for the protection of civil rights," and has given them
"special responsibilities to prevent an erosion of the individual's constitutional rights. 8 0° Since the rights being violated are purely federal in
nature, and since they are being violated by state action, it is conceivable
that Congress intended the federal judiciary to occupy a place between
the state and its citizens in this special area.
It is arguable, however, that such an absolute exception should not
be maintained. While discussing the exhaustion doctrine, the Court in
McKart v. United States,"' stated some of the purposes of the doctrine
as follows: (1) to avoid the premature interruption of the state administrative process ;82 (2) to give the administrative agency the chance to
carry out the functions for which it was created, that is, hearing the
complaints and exercising its discretion;83 (3) to give the administrative
agency the chance to solve the problem, thereby eliminating any possible
future court action ;84 (4) to maintain the administrative law policy of
autonomy by giving the agency the opportunity to discover and correct
its own problems ;85 and (5) to prevent a circumvention of the agency
procedures which would result in a weakening of the entire administrative
process by "stripping away any confidence" in the administrative system.8 6
If we add to those purposes the desire of the federal courts to avoid any
friction with the state system, a cogent argument can be presented that
even in the special area of civil rights, it is for the courts in their discretion to balance conflicting policies in reaching decisions on the question
of exhaustion of state administrative remedies.
In its last opportunity to clarify the exhaustion issue, the Supreme
Court denied certiorari.8 7 The remaining vitality of the doctrine in this
special area, therefore, still remains unanswered. Continued denial of
certiorari in such cases could indicate that the Metcalf rationale finding
"a pattern of flexibility in imposing the exhaustion requirement" may
indeed be correct. Should such a "pattern of flexibility" be present, how79. Id. at 62.
80. Id. at 58.
81. 395 U.S. 185 (1969). In McKart, petitioner was convicted for knowingly and
wilfully failing to report for and submit to induction into the armed services. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject
to numerous exceptions and that petitioner's failure to report for induction did not
foreclose his challenging the validity of his classification as a defense to his subsequent
criminal prosecution. Id. at 192-203.
82. Id. at 193.
83. Id. at 194.
84. Id. at 195.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Elmwood Properties, Inc. v. Conzelman, 418 F.2d 1025 (7th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 1063 (1970).
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ever, included in that flexibility should be those class action welfare suits
as in the instant case. It is hoped that if this question again comes before
the Court, certiorari will be granted and the confusion laid to rest. Plaintiffs proceeding today in this critical area of the law are in danger of
bearing the burden of wrong "guesses" by their attorneys and having
the determination of critical issues untimely delayed or even dismissed.
Thus, until an established pattern emerges, complete exhaustion of state
administrative remedies is surely the safest, albeit the most expensive,
way to proceed.
David F. Girard-diCarlo

CONSENSUAL PARTICIPANT MONITORING
DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A SEARCH AND SEIZURE WITHIN THE FOURTH
No CONSTITUTIONAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN REAMENDMENT DOCTRINE OF MISPLACED CONCORDING AND TRANSMITTING -

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

-

FIDENCE APPLIES FULLY TO CONSENSUAL PARTICIPANT MONITORING.

United States v. White (U.S. 1971)
Respondent White was convicted in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois of certain narcotics violations' based
2
largely on the testimony of government agents. The agents overheard
incriminating statements made by defendant to an informer by means of
3
an electronic transmitter which the informer carried concealed on his
1. The specific charges were importation and possession of narcotics in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1964) (repealed 1970) ; and sale of same in violation of 26
U.S.C. § 4705(a) (1964) (repealed 1970). Both offenses are presently covered by
21 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq. (1970).
2. Throughout the two month surveillance of the defendant, at least six government agents listened to the transmitted conversations. During the two conversations
held in the informer's home, an agent was concealed in a closet thereby fully observing
the conversants. For a similar case where an agent concealed himself in an informer's
home and later testified to the conversations observed, see United States v. Missler,
414 F.2d 1293 (4th Cir. 1969). That case, however, was not complicated by electronic
surveillance. Had a government agent concealed himself in defendant's home, his
testimony would clearly be barred at trial under the trespass doctrine established
by Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), and Goldman v. United States,
316 U.S. 129 (1942).
It has been suggested that the possibilities of electronic snooping have so
captured the American imagination that the far more common use of police spies and
undercover agents has gone unnoticed, even though the same basic objections apply
to both types of police activity, and the same fundamental social values are threatened.
See Note, Police Undercover Agents: New Threat to First Amendment Freedoms,
37 Gro. WAsH. L. REv. 634, 637 (1969). The White decision, by incorporating Hoffa
v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966), and Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206
(1966), into the field of electronic surveillance, has resolved this situation by erasing
any distinction between the bugged and unbugged agent. See pp. 359-63 infra.
3. The informer Jackson could not be located at the time of trial, but the
Court noted specifically that this posed no fourth amendment complications. A
similar situation was presented in On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952),
where the Supreme Court stated that failure of the prosecution to elicit the informer's
testimony at trial, no matter what the reason, posed no fourth amendment difficulties.
But see Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 441 (1963) (Warren, C.J., concurring) ;
Comment, Eavesdropping, Informers, and the Right of Privacy: A Judicial Tightrope,
52 CORNELL L.Q. 975, 982-84 (1967).
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person during his conversations with defendant. Although five of the
monitored conversations transpired in the defendant's own house, 4 the
trial court refused to label their procurement as a search and seizure.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, 5 holding that
the rationale expounded in United States v. Katz applied in full force to
consensual participant monitoring 7 situations. Consequently, the Seventh
Circuit held that the consensual participant transmitting presented in
White

-

since undertaken without a warrant

-

constituted an unrea-

sonable search and seizure, and the agents' testimony8 was therefore
4. Other conversations were similarly monitored, two of these occurring in
the informer's home; others occurred in a public restaurant, the informer's automobile and a public street. United States v. White, 405 F.2d 838, 840-42 (7th Cir.
1969), rev'd, 401 U.S. 745 (1971). The fact that no court has distinguished cases
based on the place where the conversation took place has been interpreted to mean
that a speaker's confidence that there will be no monitoring of his private conversations
is based on the supposed good faith of the other party, rather than the sanctity of
the place. See Greenawalt, The Consent Problem in Wiretapping and Eavesdropping:
Surreptitious Monitoring with the Consent of a Participant in a Conversation,
68 COLUM. L. REv. 190, 231 (1968) ; Kitch, Katz v. United States: The Limits of the
Fourth Amendment, 1968 SuP. CT. REv. 133, 136.
5. United States v. White, 405 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1969), rev'd, 401 U.S. 745
(1971). In reaching this conclusion, the circuit court recognized that the law
regarding consensual participant transmitting was embodied in On Lee v. United
States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952), a case quite similar on its facts to the present one. The
court interpreted Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), as overruling On Lee,
and further noted that "no distinction of constitutional significance can be drawn
between the third party overhearing presented in Katz and the consensual monitoring
here." 405 F.2d at 844. The court found Katz controlling in the present instance.
While so deciding, the Seventh Circuit stated that, but for their interpretation of
Katz, On Lee would be controlling in the present case, and should their interpretation
be incorrect, they would apply On Lee to all similar cases. Id. at 847. See United
States v. Teller, 412 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1969) for a case involving consensual participant transmitting where the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit applied the
standard established in On Lee.
6. 389 U.S. 347 (1967), noted in 13 VILL L. Rzv. 643 (1968). In Katz,
government agents attached a listening and recording device to the outside of a
telephone booth regularly used by the defendant to place illegal interstate bets.
Although noting the discriminate manner in which the eavesdropping was practiced the agents would activate the device only when they saw the defendant approaching
and took precautions to insure that only his conversations would be overheard the Supreme Court reversed defendant's conviction for interstate gambling violations,
holding that eavesdropping must be made pursuant to a court order.
7. The term "consentual participant monitoring" refers to electronic surveillance
with the aid and consent of a party participating in the conversation, and may involve
either recording or transmitting by the consenting party. In this note, consensual
participant monitoring is used to refer collectively to these techniques; when differentiation is to be made between them, more precise language is used. Any discussion
of coerced participant monitoring is beyond the scope of this note. For a general
discussion of informers and electronic surveillance, see Comment, supra note 3,
at 990.
The term "non-consensual third party eavesdropping" refers to that type of
electronic surveillance which results in the overhearing of a conversation without the
knowledge or consent of any of the participants therein. For background constitutional
history in electronic surveillance, see Greenawalt, supra note 4, at 191-202; King,
Electronic Surveillance and Constitutional Rights: Some Recent Developments and
Observations, 33 Go. WASH. L. REv. 240 (1964); Comment, Eavesdropping and
the Constitution: A Reappraisal of the Fourth Amendment Framework, 50 MINN.
L. REv. 378, 384 (1965).
8. Prior to Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), seizure of items having
only evidentiary value, as opposed to instrumentalities, fruits of the crime, or contraband, was per se unreasonable. This concept, referred to as the "mere evidence rule"
was first established in Gouled v. United States. 255 U.S. 298 (1921), and
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inadmissible at trial.' The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) consensual participant transmitting did not constitute a search
and seizure,' 0 and (2) Desist v. United States"' demanded prospective
application of Katz.12 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
unequivocally rejected in Hayden. The effect of the latter case was that incriminating
words could thereafter be seized by means of a reasonable search and subsequently
admitted as evidence, although such words constituted neither a substantive crime,
not a fruit or instrumentality thereof. The Court's rejection of the "mere evidence
rule" was essential to the Katz decision. See Spritzer, Electronic Surveillance by
Leave of the Magistrate: The Case in Opposition, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 175-76
(1969).
9. In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the Supreme Court devised
the federal exclusionary rule whereby items seized in violation of defendant's constitutional rights would be inadmissible as evidence at trial. The exclusionary rule
subsequently has been held to apply to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 .(1961).
10. In earlier interpretations of the language of the fourth amendment, the
Supreme Court established certain exceptions to the warrant procedure, but otherwise
has held that all warantless searches are per se unreasonable. See note 33 and
accompanying text infra. The White Court did not establish consensual participant
monitoring as another exception to the warrant procedure, but rather stated that
warrants are only needed for searches, and consensual participant monitoring is
not a search.
Mr. Justice Black concurred in the conclusion that consensual participant
monitoring is not a search, but based his decision on entirely different grounds, which
he revealed in his Katz dissent. Mr. Justice Black concluded that Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), is the correct statement of the law, to the
extent that only tangible things are capable of seizure. Since conversations are
intangible, they cannot be searched for, nor can they be seized. His position was
that the majority in Katz read the fourth amendment to include things wholly unknown
to its writers, and thereby "distorted" the meaning of the fourth amendment. Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 373 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice
Black's position represents the strict constructionist view of fourth amendment
interpretation.
11. 394 U.S. 244 (1969). In that case, defendant was convicted of several narcotics
violations based largely on the testimony of government agents who overheard
incriminating statements by means of a transmitting and recording device attached
to the wall of the defendant's home. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction
because the events had occurred prior to the Katz decision, and to the extent Katz
overturned existing law the Court held it was to be given prospective application.
Id. at 254. In so holding, the Court used three criteria to determine whether Katz
should be given retroactive or prospective application. The criteria the Court
observed were set out in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967):
(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of reliance
by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the
administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new constitutional
standards.
Id. at 297. The Desist Court felt that all three of the criteria militated against giving
Katz retroactive application because exclusion of electronic evidence seized prior to
the date of the Katz decision
would increase the burden on the administration of justice, would overturn
convictions based on fair reliance upon pre-Katz decisions, and would not serve
to deter similar searches and seizures in the future.
394 U.S. at 253. Consequently, the Court held that the Katz doctrine was to apply
"only to those cases in which the prosecution seeks to introduce the fruits of electronic
surveillance conducted after December 18, 1967 [the date of the Katz decision]." Id.
at 254.
In White, the electronic surveillance was conducted in 1966. Hence, the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit erred by not determining its admissibility
by pre-Katz law. In United States v. Teller, 412 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1969), the
same court, recognizing its mistake, followed Desist and applied On Lee to determine
whether evidence seized by means of an electronic surveillance was admissible.
12. Mr. Justice Brennan concurred with the plurality on this issue, but Mr.
Justice Black did not. As a result, both issues were resolved by five to four
decisions, and neither had the benefit of a majority opinion.
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As early as 1928, the Supreme Court recognized in Olinstead v.
United States' that electronic surveillance posed a serious threat to the
rights of all Americans, 14 and therefore required special judicial attention
to avoid undue governmental use of such "dirty business."' 15 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that evidence obtained by wiretapping 1 was
not the product of a fourth amendment search and seizure' 7 because there
could be no search without a physical trespass,' 8 and no seizure of mere
intangibles such as words.' 9 The Supreme Court first applied the Olinstead rationale to a non-consensual third party eavesdropping 20 situation
13. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). Defendant was convicted of many liquor violations
based upon evidence obtained by government agents through wiretapping defendant's
phones. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that wiretapping presented no fourth amendment problem.
14. Electronic surveillance has been criticized as being unhealthy for society
and degrading for government. See On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 762
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ; Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470
(1928) (Holmes, J.,dissenting). It has been considered an infringement on individual liberty. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 325 (1967) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) ; Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). Furthermore, it has been condemned as a coercive restriction on freedom
of speech. See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 470 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ; King, Wire Tapping and Electronic Surveillance: A Neglected Constitutional Consideration, 66 DICK. L. REV. 17, 25 (1961). See generally R. BROWN, THE
ELECTRONIC INVASION (1967) ; B. SPINDEL, THE OMINOUS EAR (1968) ; A. WESTIN,
PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967); Greenawalt, supra note 4, at 214-21; Comment,

Electronic Eavesdropping -

The Inadequate Protection of Private Conversation,

40 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 59 (1965); 14 VILL. L. REV. 758 (1969).

15. See generally Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469 (1928) (Brandeis
& Holmes, JJ., dissenting).
16. While wiretapping is really a situation involving non-consensual third party
eavesdropping, since Olmstead it has usually been treated as a separate area of
judicial concern, probably due to congressional enactments in the area. See Note,
From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of Fourth Amendment
Protection,43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 968, 975 n.49 (1968).
Congress, displeased with the Olmstead decision, passed the Federal Communications Act of 1934, section 605 of which placed strict limitations on wiretapping
practices, and made it a federal offense to intercept and divulge a wire communication.
47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970). Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968 supersedes section 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934, and may be
found in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 to 2520 (1970). For an extensive examination of this
enactment, see Note, Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance - Title III of the
Crime Control Act of 1968, 23 RUTGERS L. REV. 319 (1969).
17. Subsequently, in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), the Supreme
Court brought wiretapping within the fourth amendment protections. See note 29
infra. The Court felt that although wiretapping was not per se unconstitutional,
it should be sanctioned only upon issuance of a search warrant by a magistrate,
based on fourth amendment standards of probable cause and particularity. See Note,
Eavesdropping Under Court Order and the Constitution: Berger v. New York,
1 LOYOLA U.L. REV. (LA) 143 (1968).
18. The requirement of a physical trespass was questioned by Silverman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961), and expressly repudiated in Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967), when Mr. Justice Stewart, discussing the fourth amendment,
stated: "the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence
of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure." Id. at 353.
19. This misconception was finally put to rest by Mr. Justice Brennan in Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) : "[tihe Fourth Amendment may protect
against the overhearing of verbal statements as well as against the more traditional
seizure of 'papers and effects'." Id. at 485. This trespass requirement of Olmstead
had, however, been in doubt before this time. See Silverman v. United States,
365 U.S. 505 (1961) ; Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
20. See note 7 supra.
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in Goldman v. United States,21 and later, to a consensual participant
monitoring in On Lee v. United States.2 2 In the latter case, the Court
ruled that since neither the concealment of a transmitter on the informer,
nor his entry onto defendant's premises under false pretenses constituted

a trespass, there could be no unconstitutional search and seizure when
the conversation was transmitted to a government agent outside. 28 Somewhat parenthetically, the Court added that eavesdropping on a conversation with the connivance of one of the parties could in no way be likened

25
24
In Lopez v. United States,
to an unreasonable search or seizure.

21. 316 U.S. 129 (1942). Defendant's conviction rested largely on testimony
of two government agents who, by means of a detectaphone attached to the outside
of the defendant's room, heard incriminating conversations. The Supreme Court,
unable to distinguish this case from Olmstead, upheld the conviction.
22. 343 U.S. 747 (1952). The factual setting of On Lee is almost identical to
that of the present case. By applying Olmstead to consensual participant monitoring,
On Lee marked the complete incorporation of the trespass doctrine into all fields of
electronic surveillance, wiretapping and non-consensual third party eavesdropping
having been covered previously by Olmstead and Goldman, respectively.
23. Id. at 751-52.
24. Id. at 754. The Court stated that:
[I]t would be a dubious service to the genuine liberties protected by the Fourth
Amendment to make them bedfellows with spurious liberties improvised by
farfetched analogies which would liken eavesdropping on a conversation, with
the connivance of one of the parties, to an unreasonable search or seizure.
Id. In such fashion, the Court implied that although the defendant had been betrayed
by his own misplaced trust, his privacy had not been invaded.
See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 774 (1971), for Mr. Justice
Harlan's objection to reading "this unelaborated assertion as a wholly independent
ground for decision." Examination of other opinions lends support to the conclusion
that misplaced confidence was not understood to be an independent basis for the
On Lee decision. The opinions of the dissenting justices in On Lee spoke more to
the issue of the trespass doctrine rather than to any concept of misplaced confidence.
The rationale of the On Lee decision met its first test in Lopez v. United States,
373 U.S. 427 (1963). The fact that the majority in that case failed to cite On Lee
approvingly is particularly startling since the Lopez majority spoke directly to the
concept of misplaced confidence. Therefore, had the Lopez majority felt that
misplaced confidence played any role in On Lee's outcome, it certainly seems likely
that the Court would have cited it. The Lopez dissent, noting the majority's emphasis
on misplaced confidence, states that "On Lee . . . rested on no such theory ..

Id. at 449.
While it might be true that the White plurality may inflate its present
position by recognizing misplaced confidence as a wholly independent basis for the
On Lee decision, the White plurality leaves no doubt that the decisions of Hoffa
and Lewis have so substantially buttressed this misplaced confidence doctrine that
it now reflects the true state of the law.
25. 373 U.S. 427 (1963). Defendant's conviction for income tax evasion was
based primarily on a recording made by a federal agent of certain incriminating
statements defendant had made to him. Although there is some sentiment toward
limiting the Lopez decision to the facts of that case, see Lopez v. United States,
373 U.S. 427, 441 (1963) (Warren, C.J., concurring), the case has been generally
interpreted to stand for the proposition that a search warrant is not required when
one of the conversants wishes to record the conversation. Many cases have cited
Lopez for precisely this principle. See, e.g., United States v. Kaufer, 406 F.2d 550,
551 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 394 U.S. 458 (1969) ("The procedure used against Kaufer
involved the recording of a conversation with the consent of one of the parties
to that conversation, a procedure upheld in Lopez v. United States .
) ; Holt v.
United States, 404 F.2d 914, 920 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1086 (1969)
("It remains the law that the recording of a conversation between an informant and
a suspect, obtained through an electronic device concealed upon the person of the
informant . . . is admissible into evidence."). Writers have similarly understood
that "the Court in Lopez had decided that introduction of a recording, even one
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after stating that consensual participant recording is not eavesdropping, 2
the Court introduced a concept of "assumption of risk" into electronic
surveillance. It declared "that either party may record the conversation
and publish it;"27 such was the risk one took when conversing with
another. The Court has since stated that a warrant is not a precondition
28
to consensual participant recording, but does insure greater protections.
After bringing wiretapping within the scope of fourth amendment
protections in Berger v. New York, 29 the Supreme Court sought to reexamine non-consensual third party eavesdropping practices in Katz v.
0
United States.3
The Katz case presented two basic issues :81 (1) whether
obtained in the absence of judicial authorization, was permisible." See Comment,
supra note 3, at 987. See generally King, supra note 7, at 257-61.
26. The Lopez Court was able to distinguish consensual participant recording
from third party eavesdropping because it did not involve listening in on a conversation which the Government could not otherwise have observed. To the contrary,
the Government's own agent was a party to such conversation, and was free to
memorize and disclose any details thereof. The only purpose of the recording
device was to "obtain the most reliable evidence possible." 373 U.S. at 439.
27. Id. at 439, quoting Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107, 110 (1957).
By citing to Rathbun, a wiretapping case, the Lopez Court analogized the assumption
of risk in having words recorded by a confidant to the risk of having one's telephone
conversation overheard by a person who is within earshot, but has not tapped the
wire. 373 U.S. at 439.
28. In Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966), the Court faced a situation
identical to Lopez with the exception that the consensual participant recording in
Osborn proceeded with the benefit of a warrant. The Court praised the procedure
followed by the investigators in Osborn, but at the same time refused to hold that
a warrant was a constitutional precondition to consensual participant recording,
thereby implying that it was not. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 362-63
(1967) (White, J., concurring), which indicates that surreptitious use of electronic
devices by parties to a conversation is constitutional whether or not a court order
has been issued.
29. 388 U.S. 41 (1967). Defendant Berger was convicted on two counts of
conspiracy to bribe a public official. The only evidence introduced against the
defendant was certain eavesdrop evidence obtained by a recording device. The
investigating officers had obtained an eavesdrop order for the use of the recording
equipment under N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRO. § 813-a (1963). The Supreme Court invalidated
the New York eavesdropping statute, primarily because it did not meet the fourth
amendment's requirement of particularity in the warrant concerning: (1) the specific
crime committed; (2) the place to be searched; and (3) the persons or things to
to be seized. In striking down the statute, the Berger Court noted that the fourth
amendment protections applied to conversation passing over telephone wire. 388
U.S. at 51. While the situation presented by Berger was electronic surveillance, the
Court spoke extensively on the issue of wiretapping, and Mr. Justice Douglas, in his
concurring opinion, noted that it "brings wiretapping . . . fully within the purview
of the Fourth Amendment." 388 U.S. at 64. In his dissent in White, Justice Douglas
again explains the effect of the Berger decision: "We held in Berger . . . that
wiretapping is a search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
and therefore must meet its requirements.

. . ."

401 U.S. at 758. This dissent seems

to lend credence to the view that Berger was intended to cover both eavesdropping
and wiretapping situations.
30. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See note 6 supra. Despite speculation as to whether
Katz marked a retreat from the strict standard applied in Berger, certainly Katz
made it clear that, contrary to the implications of Berger, electronic surveillance under
limited conditions could be authorized by warrant. Compare Note, supra note 6, at 649,
with Comment, Wiretapping and Eavesdropping: A Case Analysis, 36 TENN. L. Rlv.
363, 372 (1969). See Dash, Katz - Variations on a Theme by Berger, 17 CATH. U.L.
REv. 296 (1968).
31. The Katz Court refused to accept the defendant's formulation of the issues,
and consequently found it necessary to restate the issues. Defendant spoke in terms of
"constitutionally protected areas" and "physical penetration" of same. The Court
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non-consensual third party eavesdropping was a search and seizure; and
(2) if so, whether such search and seizure was unreasonable when conducted without a warrant. The Court specifically overruled both Olmstead
32
and Goldman, thereby ringing the death knell of the trespass doctrine.
After listing those searches comprising exceptions to the warrant procedure,88 and noting that those exceptions did not include non-consensual
third party overhearing of a speaker's conversation, the Court held that
a warrant was a constitutional precondition to such practice because it
"violated the privacy upon which [the speaker] justifiably relied.1 34
The Katz decision, while clearly bringing non-consensual third party
eavesdropping within the ambit of the fourth amendment, was nevertheless ambiguous as to its application to situations where a participant to
the conversation has consented to the monitoring. 35 In interpreting the
scope of Katz in this regard, the circuit courts have reached contradicting conclusions. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit has concluded that Katz was not applicable to consensual participant monitoring, and that the evidence obtained by such practices was
not a search and seizure within the fourth amendment.36 The Seventh
rejected these concepts because "[tihe Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places." 389 U.S. at 349-51. Defendant's misconstruing of the issues is most understandable, as other decisions dealing with eavesdropping were primarily concerned
with intrusions into a "constitutionally protected area." See, e.g., Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41, 57-59 (1967) ; Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143 (1962) ; Silverman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510-12 (1961).
32. 389 U.S. at 353.
33. The three most notable exceptions to the warrant procedure enumerated
by Mr. Justice Stewart were: (1) searches incident to arrest; (2) searches or arrests
made in hot pursuit; and (3) consent searches. Id. at 357-58. In Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), the Court seems to have formulated another

exception, viz., in emergency situations no search warrant is necessary when delay
would result in destruction of evidence. The belief that Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S.
360 (1959), stated another exception in regards to administrative searches has been
discredited by Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). See generally
Comment, Rehabilitation, Investigation and the Welfare Home Visit, 79 YALE L.J.
746, 757 (1970).
34. 389 U.S. at 353.
35. See Greenawalt, supra note 4, at 202; Kitch, supra note 4, at 137; Note,
supra note 6, at 644. See generally Note, supra note 16.
36. In Koran v. United States, 408 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1969), noted in 14
VILL. L. REV. 758 (1969), defendant appealed his conviction for counterfeiting, which
was based largely on the testimony of a government agent who, without a warrant,
listened to the conversation between defendant and the informer which was being
transmitted to him by means of a device hidden on the informer's person. The circuit
court affirmed the defendant's conviction, holding that Katz limited itself to nonconsensual third party eavesdropping, and therefore was not controlling in a case
involving consensual participant transmitting. Id. at 1323-24. The Koran case was
not a case of first impression in the Fifth Circuit, as shown by the court's reliance
on Dryden v. United States, 391 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1968) ; Handsford v. United
States, 390 F.2d 373 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 915 (1968);
Dancy v. United States, 390 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1968); and Long v. United States,
387 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1967) (per curiam), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 952 (1968).
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in a per curiam opinion in United
States v. Kaufer, 406 F.2d 550 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 394 U.S. 458 (1969), and the Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in Holt v. United States, 404 F.2d 914 (10th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1086 (1969), have ruled the same as the Fifth Circuit
using similar reasoning.
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Circuit has held to the contrary, maintaining that the Katz rationale
dictates that surveillance by means of consensual participant monitoring
techniques is a search and seizure, which, when undertaken without a
warrant, is violative of the fourth amendment. 37
The present case represents the first attempt by the Supreme Court
to clarify the constitutional guidelines announced in Katz as they apply
generally to the entire field of consensual participant monitoring and
specifically to consensual participant transmitting. In the opinion, the
plurality, with the added, unequivocal support of Mr. Justice Black,38
clearly stated that consensual participant monitoring is not a search and
seizure within the fourth amendment. To settle this issue, the White
Court initially had to resolve: (1) whether the Katz rationale applied to
consensual participant monitoring; and (2) if not, whether Lopez and
On Lee were still good law.
Distinguishing Katz from the present case, 39 the White plurality
attempted to resolve the confusion 40 surrounding the interpretation of
Katz by showing that the Katz decision did not encompass consensual
participant monitoring. 41 Reasoning that any presumption on the part
of a speaker "that a person with whom he is conversing will not then
or later reveal the conversation to the police" 42 was not a reasonable and
"constitutionally justifiable" expectation of privacy, the plurality
concluded that Katz offered no protection to such unreasonable expectations. 43
Re-examination of the Katz opinion lends considerable support to the
contention that consensual participant monitoring did not fall within the
intended scope of Katz. The Katz case involved non-consensual third
party overhearing, and its holding limited itself to making the warrant
37. The view adopted by the Seventh Circuit is reflected in its disposition of
the present case. See note 5 supra. This court held that Katz was not limited to
non-consensual third party eavesdropping, but rather applied to all types of electronic
surveillance. United States v. White, 405 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1969), rev'd, 401 U.S.
745 (1971). The United States District Court for the District of Columbia agreed
with the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of Katz, and consequently suppressed
evidence obtained through unwarranted consensual participant monitoring in United
States v. Jones, 292 F. Supp. 1001 (D.D.C. 1968).
38. See note 10 supra.
39. 401 U.S. at 749. This same process of distinguishing Katz had been followed
by the many circuit courts that had limited the scope of Katz to non-consensual
third party eavesdropping. See, e.g., Koran v. United States, 408 F.2d 1321, 1324
(5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Kaufer, 406 F.2d 550, 551 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 394
U.S. 458 (1969) ; Holt v. United States, 404 F.2d 914, 919 (10th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1086 (1969); Dancy v. United States, 390 F.2d 370, 371
(5th Cir. 1968).
40. See notes 35 & 36 supra. The most probable cause for this confusion was
the language of the Katz opinion itself, which spoke generally about the constitutionality of the entire field of electronic surveillance, while strictly limiting its holding
to the constitutional preconditions of non-consensual third party eavesdropping. See
note 44 and accompanying text infra.
41. 401 U.S. at 751.
42. Id. at 749.
43. Id.
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procedure "a constitutional precondition to the kind of electronic surveillance involved in this case."44 Having demonstrated that Katz did not
apply to consensual participant monitoring, the plurality concluded that
any reading of Katz which construed it as overruling prior precedents, as
45
applied to the field of consensual participant monitoring, was erroneous.
The effect of Katz on prior precedents was not the only question to
be resolved in White; the grant of certiorari also indicated that the continued viability of Lopez and On Lee would seriously be questioned. 46
In considering this issue, the White Court reconstructed the foundation
of consensual participant monitoring law, and approvingly cited as the
cornerstone thereof, the Lopez principle, that no search warrant is necessary when an informer surreptitiously records the words of his fellow
conversant. 47 This reaffirmation of Lopez48 did not, however, automatically mandate similar treatment for the transmitting practice involved in
On Lee. The Court could have recognized the differences between consensual participant recording and transmitting, 49 and consequently could
have drawn "the constitutional line at this juncture between the two as
regards the necessity for obtaining a warrant. ' 50 While such an approach
44. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (emphasis added).
45. 401 U.S. at 751-54.
46. Had the Court intended the Katz decision to apply to all types of electronic
surveillance, it could have denied certiorari in the present case on the basis of its
holding in Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969), wherein the Court decided
that Katz was to be applied prospectively. See note 11 supra. Conversely, had the
Court wished to uphold the pre-Katz law on consensual participant monitoring, it
could have denied certiorari citing to On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747
(1952), buttressed perhaps by a cite to Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963),
which taken together stated the prior law regarding consensual participant monitoring.
See notes 5 & 25 supra.
47. 401 U.S. at 749.
48. Id. at 749 n.3.
49. It has been stated that recordings by a participant may be considered
lesser invasions of privacy than transmission of a conversation, because transmission
represents an instantaneous, assured invasion of privacy, while what is recorded
may never be played for another. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 788
(1971)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) ; Greenawalt, supra note 4 at 225. In his White
dissent, Mr. Justice Harlan recognized the instantaneous intrusion of privacy posed
by the presence of an uninvited ear in transmitting:
[Ilt is one thing to subject the average citizen to the risk that participants
in a conversation with him will subsequently divulge its contents to another,
but quite a different matter to foist upon him the risk that unknown thirdparties may be simultaneously listening in.
Id. at 777.
50. Id. at 792. Mr. Justice Harlan suggested drawing the constitutional line
at this point because there is an "identifiable difference - albeit an elusive one"
between the invasion of privacy presented by single party bugging and third party
bugging. Little support can be found for this position, either among the commentators
or among other courts. See note 51 infra. Of all the circuit court decisions handed
down since Katz, only the Seventh Circuit in White has attempted to distinguish
the recording situation presented by Lopez from the transmitting situation presented
by On Lee. Even here, the Seventh Circuit did not use Mr. Justice Harlan's basis
of distinction, i.e., comparative invasions of privacy, but rather a due process distinction. See 14 VILL. L. REv. 758, 762-63 n.43 (1969), which suggests that this
type of distinction is immaterial to the determination of whether there was a search
and seizure in violation of the fourth amendment, and probably for that reason has
not been adopted by other courts. In so viewing the problem, the Seventh Circuit
reflected the earlier thinking of Chief Justice Warren, who distinguished the factual
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may represent a reasonable limitation on the use of electronic surveillance,
the Court seems well-advised to avoid drawing a constitutional distinction between consensual participant monitoring techniques based on such
"hairsplitting." 51
In consenting to re-examine On Lee, the Court travelled the road
it had previously refused to follow. 52 To the extent that On Lee relied
upon the trespass doctrine, the Court concluded it was overruled. 58 The
Court, however, regarded the misplaced trust 54 aspect of On Lee as an
independent alternative holding, and on this basis reaffirmed the decision.55
Probably sensing the insufficiency of this argument for reaffirmation,
White attempted to dispel the misconception that the doctrine of misplaced confidence, expounded in Hoffa v. United States56 and Leuwis v.
United States,5 7 had no application in the area of electronic surveillance.58
settings of Lopeg and On Lee. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 441 (1963)
(Warren, C.J., concurring). In that case, however, the Chief Justice was more
concerned with limiting the use of consentual participant monitoring to corroboration of informer's testimony, than in drawing any constitutional distinction between
recording and transmitting.
51. See Comment, supra note 3, at 984. The author there suggests that it
would be little more than "an exercise in hairsplitting" to draw a constitutional distinction "between the contemporaneous overhearing of a conversation with the
consent of one of the parties, and the subsequent hearing of a recording." Id. The
author further submits that it would be ludicrous to conclude that a person had a
constitutional protection against radio transmissions of his conversations, but enjoys
no similar protection when the same people hear his conversations via a recording.

It similarly appears, the author contends, that there is no greater need for a court
order in the case of transmitting than in the case of recording. Id.
Other commentators have agreed. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 4, at 233.
"The differences between the techniques of participant monitoring are too small, in
my judgment, to justify any distinction in treatment ....
52. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), noted in 39 TUL. L. REV.
581 (1965). Massiah presented a factual situation closely analogous to that of On Lee
and the present case. Petitioner and his accomplice were arrested for certain narcotics
violations and released pending trial. The accomplice, having decided to co-operate
with the government, concealed a transmitter in his car and engaged the petitioner
in incriminating conversation. Petitioner was convicted on the testimony of agents
who overheard the transmitted conversation. The Supreme Court, ignoring the
fourth amendment issue, reversed the decision of the Second Circuit, holding that
petitioner's sixth amendment rights were denied, although the eavesdropping complication made Massiah an imperfect case for treating sixth amendment considerations.
The decision thus indicated an attempt by the Court to bide its time on consensual
participant monitoring issues. For further discussion and criticism of Massiah,
see Greenawalt, supra note 4 at 197; Note, 3 DUQ. L. REV. 99, 101 (1964); Note,
supra note 17, at 151; Note, 48 MARQ. L. REV. 247 (1964).
53. 401 U.S. at 750.
54. See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
55. 401 U.S. at 750.
56. 385 U.S. 293 (1966), noted in 19 AL". L. REv. 455 (1967). The Court
permitted the use of evidence, obtained by a paid government informer whom
petitioner thought was a compatriot, to convict petitioner of jury tampering. The
Court dismissed all fourth amendment issues, claiming that petitioner was merely the
victim of his own misplaced confidence in the informer.
57. 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
Petitioner was convicted of narcotics violations
as a result of evidence given to the authorties by one whom petitioner believed to
be a potential customer, but in point of fact was a government agent.
58. This misconception is particularly evident in the Seventh Circuit's handling
of the present case. That court would have limited the principle of Hoffa and Lewis
to such an extent that an informer would only be able to memorize or record a con-
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Citing Hoffa and Lewis for the principle that the fourth amendment
offers no protection for "a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to
whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it,"59 the
plurality adopted a view best represented by Mr. Justice White's concurring opinion in Katz, to the effect that:
[W]hen one man speaks to another he takes all the risks ordinarily
inherent in so doing, including the risk that the man to whom he
speaks will make public what he has heard. .

.

. It is but a logical

and reasonable extension of this principle that a man takes the risk
that his hearer, free to memorize what he hears for later verbatim
repetitions, is instead recording it or transmitting it to another.6 °
This theme of voluntary disclosure is at the heart of the White opinion.
The natural conclusion to be drawn from the opinion is that once a
speaker opens his mouth in the presence of another, any expectations
regarding the confidentiality or privacy of the words uttered become unjustifiable, and therefore such expectations are unprotected by the fourth
amendment. 61 In so stating the law, the Supreme Court claimed that its
"opinion is currently shared by Congress and the Executive Branch, '62
versation. The Seventh Circuit would add to this narrow reading of those cases the
further limitation that the recordings thus obtained could be used at trial only to
corroborate the informer's testimony. United States v. White, 405 F.2d 838, 847
(7th Cir. 1969), rev'd, 401 U.S. 745 (1971). See note 50 supra. The Seventh Circuit
concluded that since the present case involved transmissions entered as evidence
without the testimony of the informer, neither Hoffa nor Lewis could "provide
guidance for the present problem." 405 F.2d at 846. But see 405 F.2d at 849, where
Chief Judge Castle, in his dissent, analyzed Lopez, Lewis and Hoffa, and concluded:
Taken together, these cases establish the principle that one who voluntarily
enters into a conversation with another takes the risk that such person may
memorize, record, or (including On Lee) transmit the conversation.
This approach avoids any unduly restrictive reading of the Hoffa and Lewis decisions,
includes transmission of conversations by an informer, and clearly is the approach
favored by the Supreme Court in the present opinion.
59. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966), quoted in United States v.
White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971). Such a statement is an echo of the dissenting
opinion of Chief Judge Castle of the Seventh Circuit. See note 58 supra.
60. 389 U.S. at 363 (White, J., concurring). The Fifth Circuit quoted this
same excerpt in Koran v. United States, 408 F.2d 1321, 1323 (5th Cir. 1969), a
case which anticipated the present Supreme Court decision. See note 36 supra.
61. Although the Supreme Court does not cite it, it is submitted that there is
firm support for this proposition in the language of Katz. There, the Court stated
that "[wihat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not subject to Fourth Amendment protection." 389 U.S. at 351. Several
circuit court cases have relied on this statement. See, e.g., Koran v. United States,
408 F.2d 1321, 1323 (5th Cir. 1969) ; Dancy v. United States, 390 F.2d 370, 371 (5th
Cir. 1968). See also United States v. White, 405 F.2d 838, 850 (7th Cir. 1969)
(Castle, C.J., dissenting), rev'd, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
62. 401 U.S. at 753. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,
tit. III, ch. 119, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 to 2520 (1970). This enactment has been considered a congressional response to the Berger and Katz decisions. See Note,
Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance - Title III of the Crime Control Act of
1968, 23 RUTGERS L. REv. 319, 326 (1969). This provision supersedes section 605
of the Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970), which did not
cover the overhearing of a communication at the terminals of the communications
system, nor the overhearing of a communication with the consent of one of the
parties thereto. In addition, while section 605 prohibited the interception and disclosure of conversations by unauthorized persons, the Omnibus Act in section 2511
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as well as by the American Bar Association. 3
The dissenting justices did not deny the vitality of the Hoffa and
Lewis decisions ;64 in fact, they concede that in every conversation the
speaker normally risks being overheard and being betrayed by his listener. 65 However, those justices objected to the incorporation of the
misplaced confidence doctrine into the law of electronic surveillance because "as soon as electronic surveillance comes into play, the risk changes
crucially." 66 All of the dissenting justices found the plurality only too
further restricts the use of electronic surveillance by prohibiting the interception or
disclosure of such conversations. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1970). See Scoular, Wiretapping and Eavesdropping Constitutional Development from Olmstead to Katz,
12 ST. Louis U.L.J. 513, 547 (1968).

The Act specifically endorses consensual participant monitoring, providing

in pertinent part:
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting under color
of law to intercept a wire or oral communication where such person is a party
to the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given
prior consent to such interception unless such communication is intercepted for
the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State or for the purpose of
committing any other injurious act.
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (1970). While the Act certainly was intended to conform
wiretapping and eavesdropping practices to the constitutional standards delineated
in Berger and Katz, its success will depend upon future Supreme Court decisions.
For a case construing portions of this enactment, see United States v. United States
District Court, 444 F.2d 651 (6th Cir. 1971). For a general discussion of the ramifications of this enactment, see Comment, Electronic Surveillance: The New Standards,
35 BROOKLYN L. REV. 49 (1968) ; Comment, Electronic Surveillance by Law Enforcement Officers, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 63 (1969). For an excellent treatment of the
history and constitutional considerations of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act, see Schwartz, The Legitimation of Electronic Eavesdropping: The
Politics of "Law and Order," 67 MICH. L. REV. 455 (1969).
63. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
(1971).
Section 4.1 discusses consensual overhearing or recording and provides:
The [use of electronic surveillance techniques by law enforcement officers
for the] surreptitious overhearing or recording of a wire or oral communication [s]
with the consent of, or by, one of the parties to the communication should be
permitted, unless such communication is overheard or recorded for the purpose
of committing a crime or other unlawful harm. [Brackets and underscorings
are included in the original.]
The American Bar Association states that the intended purpose of this section is
the interpretation of the Supreme Court decisions in Berger, Katz and Osborn.
Such a statement makes this section's purported support for White particularly
susceptible to attack. See United States v: White, 401 U.S. 745, 790 n.25, 791 (1971)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
64. The plurality points out that even the Seventh Circuit did not deny the
integrity of these decisions in reaching its opinion below. 401 U.S. at 749. It might
be recalled that the Seventh Circuit merely denied the applicability of Hoffa and
Lewis to the present case. See note 58 supra.
65. The present dissenting opinions are merely echoes of Mr. Justice Brennan's
dissent in Lopez. In that opinion, two objections were raised to the practice of
consensual participant monitoring: (1) the speaker should have the right of determining to what extent his words shall be communicated; and (2) a speaker has a
right to expect inaccurate testimony from an informer, as well as a chance to impeach.
See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 428, 446 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 465-66. Of equal importance to the dissenting justices is the correspondingly greater invasion of privacy presented by electronic betrayal. Justice
Harlan suggested that electronic betrayal "goes beyond the impact on privacy occa-
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willing to, as Justice Harlan put it, "merely recite the expectations and
67
risks without examining the desirability of saddling them upon society."
Justice Harlan sought an earnest examination of the conflicting social
issues underlying the use of electronic devices. His conclusion, which
was shared by Justices Marshall, Douglas and Brennan, was that before
a speaker should be deemed to have assumed the risk involved in a certain
electronic snooping practice, the Court should assess "the nature of [the]
particular practice and the likely extent of its impact on the individual's
sense of security balanced against the utility of the conduct as a technique
of law enforcement." 68 By employment of this balancing test, all of
the dissenting justices concluded that it was reasonable to impose the
risk of nonelectronic betrayal upon a speaker, but the invasion of privacy
presented by electronic betrayal was so pervasive 69 that it demanded a
70
warrant for its use.
There can be no doubt that the plurality evades any forthright
examination of the conflicting social issues in the use of unwarranted
electronic eavesdropping equipment. In so doing, the plurality shields
itself by invocation of the talasmanic phrase "assumption of risk."
Although it might appear that the plurality has shirked its judicial responsibility, it must be noted that stating that a speaker assumes the
risk that his listener is a bugged secret agent, is an effective way of
saying that such risk is tolerable in light of the benefits rendered by
71
such agents.
sioned by the ordinary type of 'informer' investigation upheld in Lewis and Hoffa."
401 U.S. at 787 (Harlan, J.,dissenting). Mr. Justice Douglas agreed with this
view, and quoted affirmatively Mr. Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Lopez:
"Electronic aids add a wholly new dimension to eavesdropping. They make it more
penetrating, more indiscriminate, more truly obnoxious to a free society." 401 U.S.
at 759-60 (Douglas, J., dissenting), quoting Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427,
466 (1963) (Brennan, J.,dissenting). The dissenting justices reasoned that since
electronic betrayal involved a distinctly greater invasion of privacy than nonelectronic
betrayal, the constitutional line should be drawn between the two in regards to
obtaining a warrant, especially since "[ilnterposition of a warrant requirement is
designed . . . to secure a measure of privacy and a sense of personal security
throughout our society." 401 U.S. at 790 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
67. 401 U.S. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
68. Id.
69. The dissenting justices would distinguish the risk of a listener's memorization and subsequent repetition of the conversation from the risk of its simultaneous.
recording or transmission. This position fs based on Mr. Justice Brennan's dissent
in Lopez, where he stated that "[t]here is no security from that kind of eavesdropping,
no way of mitigating the risk, and so not even a residuum of true privacy." Lopez
v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 466 (1963). Justices Douglas and Goldberg shared
the view of Mr. Justice Brennan, joining in his Lopez dissent. It has been suggested
that Chief Justice Warren, in his concurring opinion in Lopez, 373 U.S. at 441, and
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority in Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323,
329 n.7 (1966), have expressed limited approval of Mr. Justice Brennan's view. See
14 VILL. L. Rv.758, 763 n.47 (1969).
70. Mr. Justice Harlan concluded: "[flor those more extensive intrusions that
significantly jeopardize the sense of security . . . at the least warrants should be
necessary." 401 U.S. at 786-87. Mr. Justice Douglas agreed that "the requirement
of warrants under the Fourth Amendment is essential to a free society." Id. at 762.
71. See Note, supra note 2, at 657. The article discusses the tendency of
the courts to resort to the phrase "assumption of risk" in cases involving unbugged
secret agents. Id. at 652-58.
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Despite the objections of the dissenting justices, the rationale behind
Hoffa clearly shows that it is most amenable to application to the law
of electronic surveillance. Hoffa went far in expounding and clarifying
the Lopez concept of misplaced confidence.7 2 It is therefore only natural
to look to Hoffa in other cases relying on that same aspect of Lopez.
Since the Court demonstrated that, to a large degree, the entire field of
electronic surveillance depends on Lopez, the broad applicability of Hoffa
would seem to be a natural consequence, if not a necessity. Conversely,
it is therefore not surprising that any reliance on Hoffa is subject to the
same arguments as were posed by the dissenting Justices in Lopez. 78
Recognizing this, the Court stated that since the fourth amendment offers
no protection against misplaced trust, which necessarily involves disclosure of the conversation by the informer himself, it cannot be construed to offer protection merely because a new means of dissemination
is involved. 74 Such a statement again refutes75 arguments based on Mr.
Justice Brennan's dissenting language in Lopez.
Another argument posed against the present plurality opinion is
whether a speaker has a right to anticipate that any conversations divulged
to law enforcement authorities would come from the independent recollection of the informer and hence be inaccurate. The plurality treated
this in a rather cursory fashion, and concluded that a defendant has no
"Fourth Amendment privilege against a more accurate version of the
events in question. '7 6 When faced with the same problem in Lopez, the
Court 77 explained that the risk one takes in conversing with another
fairly includes the risk that such conversation "would be accurately reproduced in court, whether by faultless memory or mechanical recording."78 Support may be drawn for the plurality's position from the Katz
subjective standard of a reasonable and constitutionally justifiable expectation. 79 The Court's consistency, however, in handling the issue
probably indicates the futility of the argument.
The final point considered by the plurality was whether the absence
of the informer at the time of the trial posed any fourth amendment
72. See note 25 supra. See also 19
73. See note 65 supra.
74. 401 U.S. at 752.

ALA.

L. REV. 455 (1967).

75. Justices Douglas and Brennan both point to their dissent in Lopez as the
full embodiment of their present objections. Their argument was refuted in Lopez,
and fell victim to the same fate here.
76. 401 U.S. at 753. The Court noted that "we are unpersuaded that [the
speaker] would distinguish between probable informers on the one hand and probable
informers with transmitters on the other." Id.
77. Mr. Justice Black, on the basis of his holding with the majority in Lopez,
would probably agree with the plurality on this point.

78. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 439 (1963).
79. Since the plurality has already indicated that at the moment the words leave
the speaker's mouth any expectation he may have concerning the further confidentiality
of them is unreasonable and therefore unprotected by the Katz doctrine, it is a
simple step forward to say that he should not be surprised to be confronted in the
courtroom by an exact reproduction of those words.
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problems. The Court, relying on On Lee, answered in the negative, stating
that while such unavailability at trial may pose evidentiary problems, it
does "not appear critical to deciding whether prior events invaded the
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights."' 0 This is a wholly plausible
argument, because the alleged fourth amendment violation occurred at
the time of the monitoring, not at the time of the trial. If such unavailability caused particularly harsh consequences, the best solution would be
invocation of the Court's supervisory power to exclude the evidence. 8'
Although the possibilities presented by unwarranted consensual participant monitoring may stagger the imagination, it is submitted that the
logic of the Court's present decision cannot be faulted. The Court effectively ties together all its recent decisions regarding privacy of conversation, thereby establishing a general rule that neither consensual
participant recording nor transmitting requires a warrant. For the Court
to have adopted any other position would have involved either a complete
break with prior precedents, or acceptance of a rule based upon overly
restrictive readings of previous case law. By adopting its present approach,
the Court gives clarity and unity to the field of electronic surveillance.
While the Court has seemingly closed the door to policy arguments
against the practice of consensual participant monitoring in general, it
may choose to consider possible specific limitations. Possible limitations
include: (1) use of the supervisory power to exclude evidence obtained
by a particularly repulsive use of electronic surveillance ;82 (2) invocation of the supervisory power to exclude evidence if inability to crossexamine the other participant makes it impossible to establish a possible
entrapment defense or to show that the evidence produced is not an
accurate or complete record;83 and (3) expansion of the doctrine of
Massiah v. United States 4 to include statements made prior to arrest.
The viability of these limitations can be determined only through future
decisions of the Supreme Court, which has given no indication that its
examination of electronic surveillance has been concluded.
FrancisP. Devine
80. 401 U.S. at 753-54.
81. See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 441 (1963) (Warren, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice Warren would limit the use of evidence gained by consensual
participant monitoring to corroborating the informer's testimony in some such cases.
See note 50 supra. Such power is available to the Court by means of its supervisory
power. 373 U.S. at 446 n.3.
82. Mr. Justice Black proposed this very idea in the first consensual monitoring
case. See On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 758 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting).
83. See Greenawalt, supra note 4, at 228. This may be particularly important
considering the precise methods of splicing tapes apparently available. See Lopez v.
United States, 373 U.S. 427, 468 n.17 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ; DASH,
SCHWARTZ & KNOWLTON, THE EAVESDROPPERS (1959).
84. 377 U.S. 201 (1964). See note 52 supra.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SPEEDY TRIAL AND

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE -

RIGHT

TO

A

WHERE THERE HAS BEEN A SUBSTANTIAL DELAY

CLAIMANT RAISES A

PRIMA

FACIE SHOWING OF RESULTANT

HARM, BURDEN OF PROVING ABSENCE OF PREJUDICE HELD

To

BE

ON COMMONWEALTH.

Commonwealth v. Clark (Pa. 1971)
In 1951 petitioner Clark, while serving a ten to twenty-five year
sentence for robbery, confessed to the warden of the Indiana State
Reformatory to the commission of various crimes in the Philadelphia
area including murder. On February 4, 1952, the petitioner was brought

to Philadelphia where he executed a signed confession confirming his
earlier statements. Subsequent to petitioner's return to Indiana, he was
indicted on a murder charge by a Philadelphia grand jury, but was not
notified of this fact. Petitioner was released to the custody of Pennsylvania authorities in October, 1958, and was tried on the Pennsylvania
murder charge on March 30, 1959. Clark was convicted of murder in the
first degree and sentenced to life imprisonment.'
Petitioner filed for relief in 1967,2 and an evidentiary hearing was
subsequently held on August 25, 1970. The court held that Clark had
not been deprived of his sixth amendment right to a speedy trial and
denied his motion for a discharge or a new trial, finding that the delay
was not unreasonable under all the circumstances, and that Clark was
8
not prejudiced in defending the charge.
Clark appealed from this ruling, basing his claim upon a seven year
delay between indictment and conviction which deprived him of his right
to a speedy trial as guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth amendments
of the United States Constitution. The Pennsylvania supreme court
reversed and remanded, 4 holding that where claimant suffered a substan1. At his trial petitioner denied committing the murder, stating his confession
was a fabrication designed to secure transfer away from his cellmate. Commonwealth

v. Clark ..... Pa-. - -

279 A.2d 41, 43 (1971).

2. Although Clark made no direct appeal from his judgment of sentence, he
petitioned pursuant to the Post Conviction Hearing Act, PA. STAT. tit. 19, §§ 1180-1
et seq. (1965). Thereafter, petitioner filed post trial motions contending, inter alia,
that he had been denied his right to a speedy trial. The hearing court, although
rejecting petitioner's other claims, held that an evidentiary hearing was necessary
in order to resolve the speedy trial claim. Commonwealth v. Clark, No. 287 (C.P.,
Trial Div., Crim. Section, Philadelphia County, Oct. 1, 1969). The court ordered
a new trial to enable petitioner to raise that issue in a pretrial hearing. The
Commonwealth appealed from the order granting a new trial, and the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, on the basis that a new trial was inappropriate merely to
provide a forum for an evidentiary hearing, vacated that order and remanded the
record for further proceedings on the claim of denial of a speedy trial. Commonwealth
v. Clark, 439 Pa. 192, 266 A.2d 741 (1970).
3. Commonwealth v. Clark, No. 287 (C.P., Trial Div., Crim. Section,
Philadelphia County, Nov. 16, 1970).
4. The court felt that the Commonwealth might have assumed in good faith
that the claimant had the burden, and thus remanded to allow it to meet its newly
raised burden.
Pa. at -.... ,279 A.2d at 50.
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tial delay and his uncontradicted testimony raised a prima facie showing
of resultant harm, the burden to affirmatively prove the absence of
prejudice properly rested upon the Commonwealth. Commomwealth v.
Clark, _- Pa.
,279 A.2d 41 (1971).
The right to a speedy and public trial - traditional in AngloAmerican jurisprudence - is guaranteed by the sixth amendment of the
United States Constitution. 5 Nevertheless, this right has only recently
been made applicable to the states, through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, via the case of Klopfer v. North Carolina.6 Prior
to this decision, however, the Supreme Court had articulated that the
speedy trial guarantee served a three-fold purpose:
[1] to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, [2]
to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation and
[3] to limit the possibilities that long delay will hamper the ability
7
of the accused to defend himself.
In this context, the Supreme Court in Smith v. Hooey,8 finding
that the dangers of the harms expressed in Ewell9 were "both aggravated
and compounded in the case of an accused who is imprisoned in another
jurisdiction,"' 1 abandoned the so-called majority rule" which held that
the states had no affimative duty to make a good faith effort to bring these
individuals into custody in order to bring them to trial.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. This right is also constitutionally guaranteed in

forty-three states, among them Pennsylvania. PA. CoNsT. art. 1, § 9, reads in
pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused hath a right to . . . a
speedy public trial .... "

6. 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
7. United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966).
8. 393 U.S. 374 (1969).
9. United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966).
10. 393 U.S. at 378. See Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970).
11. Prior to Klopfer, there existed a large majority of decided cases holding
that the state had no affirmative duty to bring to trial an accused serving a prison
sentence in another jurisdiction. E.g., Ruip v. Commonwealth, 415 S.W.2d 372 (Ky.
1967); Dreadfulwater v. State, 415 P.2d 493 (Okla. Crim. App. 1966); Cooper v.
Texas, 400 S.W.2d 890 (Tex. 1966). The formalistic conception of sovereignty was
the foremost rationale advanced for this proposition,
since the sovereign seeking to try the prisoner did not have the power and the
authority to bring him to trial. This rule applied even if the custodial sovereign
agreed to allow the other sovereign to try their prisoner.
Lawrence v. Blackwell, 298 F. Supp. 708, 712 (N.D. Ga. 1969). See Note, Effective
Guarantee of a Speedy Trial for Convicts in Other Jurisdictions,77 YALE L.J. 767

(1968).

Another view expounded to justify the so-called majority rule was that the
accused has, in fact, waived his right to a speedy trial when he flees the accusing
jurisdiction. It has also been justified by the substantial expense involved in securing
temporary custody and transporting the accused to and from trial. See Dreadfulwater
v. State, 415 P.2d 493 (Okla. Crim. App. 1966). Finally, it has been suggested
that one of the reasons for allowing such a delay is the relief it gives overworked
prosecutors who may welcome a chance to postpone. See Note, Detainers and the
Correctional Process, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 417, 418-19.
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In its most recent decision in this area, the Supreme Court in
Dickey v. Florida12 was faced with similar facts to those in Smith.'8
In Dickey, the Court reversed the decision of the Florida district court
of appeals,' 4 finding actual prejudice on the record, and concluding that
the unreasonable delay (seven years) in conjunction with evidence of
prejudice made remand unnecessary. 5 Although the Court remained
silent as to the retroactive effect of Smith, by applying this rule as it
did in Dickey, the Court effectively accorded retroactive treatment of the
Smith holding.'0
Notwithstanding their effect upon the law in this area, these cases
have resulted in two unsettled questions: first, it has not been conclusively determined whether prejudice is a necessary element to invoking
this constitutional right;17 and second, if prejudice is an element, it
remains to be determined who should bear the burden of proving the
presence or absence of actual harm resulting from the delay.' 8
Recently, in United States v. Ewell,'9 the Supreme Court held that
the establishment of prejudice was necessary for one to be denied his
right to a speedy trial,20 and placed the burden upon the accused to
12. 398 U.S. 30 (1970).
13. In Smith, the defendant, while a prisoner in the federal penitentiary in
Leavenworth, Kansas, was indicted in Texas on charges of theft. In Dickey, the
defendant in a federal prison in a foreign jurisdiction was awaiting prosecution on
a Florida state charge.
14. Dickey v. Florida, 215 So. 2d 772 (Fla. Ct. App. 1968).
15. 398 U.S. at 38.
16. In Dickey, the Smith holding was applied to state conduct occurring prior
to Smith.
17. In United States v. Jackson, 369 F.2d 936 (4th Cir. 1966), the court held
that prejudice must always be shown. However, in United States v. Lustman, 258
F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1958), it was stated that no showing of prejudice was required
when a sixth amendment speedy trial claim is presented.
18. A majority of courts require the accused to prove actual prejudice. E.g.,
Powell v. United States, 352 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1965) ; Mackey v. United States,
351 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Buatte v. United States, 350 F.2d 389 (9th Cir.
1965); Hanrahan v. United States, 348 F.2d 363 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Barnes v.
United States, 347 F.2d 925 (8th Cir. 1965) ; United States v. Simmons, 338 F.2d 804
(2d Cir. 1964); United States v. Fay, 313 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1963); United States
v. Shelton, 211 F. Supp. 869 (D.D.C. 1962).
However, if there were an unreasonable delay, the prosecution would carry
the burden of proof. E.g., Williams v. United States, 250 F.2d 19 (D.C. Cir. 1957);
United States v. Parrott, 248 F. Supp. 196 (D.D.C. 1965).
19. 383 U.S. 116 (1966). In Ewell, the defendants had already been sentenced
to prison when a subsequent circuit court decision invalidated the convictions. Laver
v. United States, 320 F.2d 187 (7th Cir. 1963). The defendants were released from
prison, but only after they had served nineteen months of their sentence. Upon
release, they were immediately rearrested on new complaints. The district court
granted defendants' motion to dismiss on the ground that they had been denied their
right to a speedy trial. United States v. Ewell, 242 F. Supp. 451 (S.D. Ind. 1964);
United States v. Dennis, 242 F. Supp. 166 (S.D. Ind. 1964). The Government's
petition for rehearing on the dismissal of the indictment was denied by the district
court. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the delay was
not a violation of the defendants' right to a speedy trial.
20. 383 U.S. at 120. The Court stated that the nineteen month delay did not by
itself demonstrate a violation of the sixth amendment guarantee of a speedy trial,
but instead looked for a showing of the types of prejudice which the guarantee was
designed to obviate.
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bring forth proof of such prejudice. 21 Although this decision appeared
to answer the undetermined questions, the case had only limited application and was therefore not determinative. 22 In three kindred cases
subsequent to Ewell, the implication clearly arose that prejudice was a
23
necessary element to show an abridgement of the speedy trial right.
However, since the courts currently lack any express guidelines concerning the burden of proof, that issue has not been resolved with any
great degree of uniformity.2 4
In Clark, the Commonwealth initially conceded that no effort, diligent
or otherwise, was made to bring the petitioner to trial in Pennsylvania
between 1952 and 1959, but argued that its conduct was not unreasonable
in light of the fact that the constitutional duty to bring prisoners from
other jurisdictions to trial was far from clear prior to the United States
Supreme Court decision in Smith v. Hooey.25 The court countered, stat-

ing that it was not concerned with finding fault with the Commonwealth,
but rather with ensuring constitutionally fair trials. 26 Moreover, the
court found that even under the less strict standards applicable prior to

Smith, the Commonwealth's conduct would have fallen short in the
present case.27 Nevertheless, Mr. Justice Roberts, speaking for the
21. Id. at 122. The Court stated:
[A]ppellees' claim of possible prejudice in defending themselves is insubstantial,
speculative and premature. They mention no specific evidence which has actually
disappeared or has been lost, no witnesses who are known to have disappeared.
Thus, the Court refused to find an abridgement of the accused's right to a speedy
trial where he has not shown prejudice.
22. The Court had not yet held that the sixth amendment right to a speedy
trial applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Thus, the practical
effect of the decision was limited to those cases arising in the federal courts.
23. In Smith v. Hooey and Klopfer v. North Carolina,the cases were remanded
for determination of whether or not the accused had been prejudiced. In Dickey
v. Florida, the Court concluded that the unreasonable delay in conjunction with the
evidence of prejudice made a remand unnecessary, and reversed. All three decisions
show a clear implication that prejudice is a necessary element of the speedy trial claim.
24. Although the Court in Ezvell placed the burden of proof upon the defendant,
neither Klopfer, Smith, nor Dickey reaffirmed that position. For a complete analysis
of this issue, see Note, Constitutional Right to a Speedy Trial: The Element of
Prejudice and the Burden of Proof, 44 TEMP. L.Q. 310 (1971). See also Note,
The Right to a Speedy Criminal Trial, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 846, 847 n.7 (1957).
After Klopfer, future speedy trial cases in state courts will be measured
by federal standards. This, however, does not mean that the state guarantees of
a speedy trial are unimportant. These guarantees will continue to have operative
significance to the extent that they furnish greater protection than does the federal
guarantee, and to the extent that the federal law on speedy trials is unclear. Cf.
Note, Freedom of Expression Under State Constitutions, 20 STAN. L. REV. 318
(1968).
25 -...... Pa. at ----279 A.2d at 46.
26.
Pa. at -..... 279 A.2d at 47.
27. Id. The court stated:
[T]wo of the traditional justifications for a state's failure to attempt to try
persons confined in other jurisdictions were the accusing state's lack of power
and authority to gain custody of such persons and a desire to avoid the expense
of temporary extradition for trial. But Pennsylvania did in fact gain custody
of appellant in the early part of 1952 when it had him brought to Philadelphia
to execute a signed confession. Thus, the Commonwealth can scarcely be heard
to complain that it lacked the power and the authority to afford appellant a
speedy trial. For the same reason there can be no merit in any argument that
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majority in Clark, made it quite clear that notwithstanding the Commonwealth's breach of its constitutional duty, "he [Clark] is still not entitled
to any relief unless he was prejudiced by the delay. ' 28
In examining whether the instant petitioner was prejudiced, the court
analyzed the three-fold purpose of the sixth amendment speedy trial
guarantee articulated in United States v. Ewell as it applied to the facts
of the present case.29 The Clark court first determined that oppressive
incarceration prior to trial can manifest itself as an irretrievable loss of
the possibility of receiving a partially concurrent sentence with the one
presently being served. 30 In the present case, however, the court found
no suggestion that petitioner suffered any undue or oppressive incarceration as a result of the delay. 31 Secondly, the court recognized that
since petitioner was unware of the Pennsylvania indictment, he could
suffer no anxiety, emotional distress, or impediment to his rehabilitation
as a result of the public accusation. 32 Finally, the court discussed the
third purpose, announced in Ewell, of the speedy trial guarantee limitation of the possibility that long delay will hamper the ability of
the accused to defend himself. Since this possibility is increased when
the accused is a prisoner in another jurisdiction, 33 the court found it
could not overlook petitioner's claim that a seven year delay of his trial
impaired his ability to prepare a defense.3 4 The Clark court examined
the seven year postponement of appellant's trial was rendered reasonable by a
desire to save the state the monetary costs of temporary extradition.
---Pa. at ----279 A.2d at 47-48.
28.
Pa. at ---,279 A.2d at 48.
29. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
30 .
----Pa. at ......
, 279 A.2d at 48. This refers to the increased duration of
the imprisonment as well as to worsened conditions of that imprisonment.
31. Id. The Indiana imprisonment was not adversely affected; nor, in light of
Clark's present sentence of life imprisonment, was his incarceration lengthened by
reason of delay.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34 -....Pa. at ----279 A.2d at 48-49. The court stated:
At his trial in 1959, appellant offered no alibi defense. His two court
appointed attorneys had visited him in prison after his return to Pennsylvania
in 1958 in order to discuss the preparation of his defense. According to appellant,
when they asked him to recall his movements and whereabouts on March 3,
1951, the approximate date of the murder, he responded that he thought he had
been in Baltimore, Maryland at the time but could not remember the names
or addresses of any potential witnesses.
In addition to the loss of a possible alibi defense, appellant claims that
his opportunity to convince the jury of the falsity of his confession was eroded
by the passage of time. At trial appellant testified that in the weeks and months
following his return to Indiana he recanted and repudiated his confession to
numerous persons at the Indiana State Reformatory. He supplied his attorneys
with the names of five such individuals, including a prison psychiatrist, a chaplain
and a deputy warden. None of these persons appeared at trial, and appellant
testified that the reason for their absence lay in the fact that when his lawyers
attempted to contact them they were no longer at the Indiana institution and
could not be located.
Finally, appellant asserts that the seven year pretrial delay further hindered
his ability to demonstrate the untruthfulness of his confession by causing the
loss of an opportunity to prove the falsity of a specific portion of the confession
wherein he stated that he had pawned a ring owned by the victim. Appellant
testified that the ring mentioned in the confession actually belonged to him,
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the actions of the hearing court which found that petitioner's testimony
was unworthy of belief,8 5 and the delay of his trial did not impair his
ability to defend himself. Clark decided that the lower court "must
have necessarily concluded that appellant bore the burden of affirmatively
demonstrating prejudice,"86 but disagreed with this conclusion, stating that
"[o]n this record, we think that the allocation of the burden of proof
87
was erroneous. 3
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was faced with a great divergence of opinion as to what role prejudice should play in a speedy trial
determination. A few jurisdictions require that the accused show prejudice in all cases alleging denial of a speedy trial, 88 while others require
no showing of prejudice when asserting a constitutional right under the
sixth amendment.8 9 The Clark court discussed various intermediate positions, the first of which establishes a conclusive presumption of prejudice
after there has been a substantial delay. 40 A second view places the
initial burden of proving prejudice upon the accused, with a rebuttable
presumption of prejudice arising if there has been a substantial delay. 41
A third, suggested by Mr. Justice Harlan, requires the prosecution to
negate the presence of harm whenever an accused establishes a prima
facie showing of prejudice. 42
In light of these views, the court in the instant case initially found
"that the categorical rule requiring a defendant to prove actual prejudice
in all circumstances is unsupportable. ' 48 Clark then restated a commentator's conclusion that, " '[w] ith the exception of the due process
clause, no procedural safeguard in the Bill of Rights designed to assure
the reliability of the guilt-determination process other than the right to
a speedy trial ... [has been held to require] a defendant to show actual
prejudice in order to establish a violation of that safeguard.' 44 Hownot the victim, but that this fact could not be verified inasmuch as the ring
had been resold by the time his attorneys visited the pawn shop.
35. The Commonwealth offered no evidence to dispute the petitioner's testimony

at the evidentiary hearing.

36. __ Pa. at ___ 279 A.2d at 49.
37. Id.

38. E.g., United States v. Jackson, 469 F.2d 936, 939 (4th Cir. 1966).
39. E.g., United States v. Lustman, 258 F.2d 475, 477-78 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 880 (1958).
40 -...Pa. at _, 279 A.2d at 49, citing Commonwealth v. Green, 353 Mass. 687,
234 N.E.2d 534 (1968).
41 .--. Pa. at . 279 A.2d at 49, citing Smith v. United States, 418 F.2d 1120
(D.C. Cir. 1969) (one year) ; Pitts v. North Carolina, 395 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1968)
(sixteen years) ; United States v. Blanca Perez, 310 F. Supp. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
(four years).
42. -_ Pa. at ---, 279 A.2d at 49, citing Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 384
(1969) (Harlan, J., concurring).
43
___.
Pa. at __., 279 A.2d at 49.
44. Id., citing Note, The Right to a Speedy Trial, 20

(1968).

STAN.

L.

REV.

476, 494

In the Bill of Rights, there are nine procedural guarantees, other than the
speedy trial and due process provisions, that promote the reliability of the guiltdetermination process. The nine include: the fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination; the eighth amendment prohibition against excessive bail; and the sixth
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ever, relying on the explicit language of the sixth amendment, 45 the court
found it difficult to reconcile this statement with the Supreme Court
holding in Klopfer that the speedy trial guarantee is "as fundamental as
46
any of the rights secured by the sixth amendment."
amendment rights which include the right to a public trial and an impartial jury,
the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be tried in
the district in which the crime was committed, to confront the prosecution's witnesses,
and to have the assistance of counsel.
The privilege against self-incrimination primarily serves to protect the
dignity and integrity of the individual. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460
(1966). Additionally, the fact that a coerced confession may be untrustworthy requires
its exclusion at trial to promote the reliability of the guilt-determination process.
Rodgers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
One of the functions of the prohibition against excessive bail is to assure
that the accused will not be hampered in his ability to prepare his defense. See
Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
To restrain the potential abuses of judicial power and to increase the possibility
that unknown persons may come forward to reveal relevant facts that may lead to
the accused's guilt or innocence, the right to a public trial was adopted. In re Oliver,
333 U.S. 257 (1948).

The defendant must show that there were preconceived opinions concerning
his guilt or innocence before the defendant can assert that he was denied his right
to an impartial jury. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
In order to comply with the defendant's right to be informed of the nature
and the cause of the accusation against him, the Government is required to prepare
a charge which must contain a description of the alleged offense that would enable the
defendant to present a defense. See Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29 (1896).,
The right to be tried in the district in which the crime was committed "is
a safeguard against the unfairness and hardship involved when an accused is prosecuted in a remote place." United States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405, 407 (1958).
The right of confrontation and cross-examination of the prosecution's
witnesses is also an essential factor in maintaining the reliability of the guiltdetermination process.
[C]ertainly no one experienced in the trial of lawsuits, would deny the value
of cross-examination in exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth in the
trial of a criminal case.
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965).
The defendant's right to compulsory attendance of witnesses may be fundamental to his ability to prepare and present a defense. United States v. Davenport,
312 F.2d 303 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 841 (1963).
The right to counsel is one of the most fundamental rights in maintaining
the reliability of the guilt-determination process, since most individuals are unable to
prove their innocence without an attorney's assistance. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932). The Supreme Court, in determining whether this guarantee had been
violated, has demonstrated an interesting attitude toward the role of prejudice. In
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), the Court held that unless waived, the right
to counsel for an indigent was absolute in all federal criminal proceedings. In Betts
v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), the Court held that there was no violation of due
process when a state fails to appoint counsel for an indigent unless under the
particular facts of the case it was "offensive to the common and fundamental ideas
of fairness." Id. at 473. In the following cases, the requirement of prejudice was
abandoned. In Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961), the Court held that
regardless of prejudice, the defendant in a capital case requires the appointment of
counsel. Later, in Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962), the Hamilton
rule was extended to trials in which the defendant was being charged with being an
habitual criminal. Finally, in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the sixth
amendment right to counsel was made applicable to the states. See generally Note,
supra, at 494 n.131.
45. The precise language of the sixth amendment is that "[iun all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial .... " U.S.
CONsT. amend. VI. The Clark court's paraphrase of this language is quite exact:
"every criminal defendant enjoys an unequivocal and unconditional right to a
speedy trial." __ Pa. at -...- 279 A.2d at 49.
46. 386 U.S. at 223.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol17/iss2/5

36

Editors: Recent Developments

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 17

Mr. Justice Roberts, speaking for the court in Clark, emphasized
that it was difficult to comprehend why a violation of the right to a
speedy trial should be consigned to an inferior status and treated less
47
favorably than violations of other constitutional rights. Justice Roberts
also commented on the fact that any requirement that an accused prove
actual prejudice would also directly conflict with the general rule that
"before federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must
be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt."' 43 By this, the court was apparently articulating yet another
manifestation of the current misallocation of the burden of proof of
prejudice.
Even though the Pennsylvania supreme court engaged in such strong
language advocating elevation of the status of the right to a speedy trial
to one which in all circumstances the accused would be free of any
necessity of demonstrating prejudice, 49 it did not feel it necessary to
reach such a decision because of the facts in Clark. 0 It is submitted, however, that the court, on the basis of its foregoing rationale, would have
51
held this to be the case had it been faced with this particular problem.
Nevertheless, the Clark court did explicitly hold that where appellant
suffered a seven year delay and raised a prima facie showing of resultant
, 279 A.2d at 50. It follows that the court felt the speedy
47. ____Pa. at
trial right should be elevated to the status of the other constitutional rights.

48. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). This approach of requiring
the beneficiary of the error to prove that it was harmless or forego the erroneously
obtained judgment is directly opposed to the doctrine applied by the states to trial
error, where the person alleging error must prove that it was harmful. Noonan v.
Paine, 293 N.Y. 892, 49 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1944) ; Insurance Dep't v. Johnson, 432 Pa. 543,
248 A.2d 308 (1968) ; Dixon v. McNamara, 188 Pa. Super. 250, 146 A.2d 744 (1958).
49. When a sixth amendment right to a speedy trial is at stake, it may be
more realistic to assume prejudice once the accused was denied a reasonable prosecution. Within the context of the sixth amendment, the defendant generally is not
required to show that he was prejudiced by the denial of safeguards: See Douglas
(confrontation); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368
v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965)
(counsel) ; Johnston v. United States, 351 U.S. 215 (1956)
U.S. 52 (1961)
(trial in the district where the crime was committed) ; Dennis v. United States,
(impartial jury and compulsory process) ; United States
339 U.S. 162 (1950)
v. Seeger, 303 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1954) (knowledge of the charges against him);
United States v. Kobb, 172 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1949) (public trial). Prejudice is
usually presumed when any of these safeguards is shown to have been denied, the
reason being that concrete evidence that their denial has caused the defendant substantial prejudice is often unavailable; if prejudice is not presumed, this denial of
constitutional protection is without a remedy. Therefore, prejudice would only become
an issue, as a rule, if the Government wishes to argue harmless error.
50. See note 34 supra.
51. As Mr. Justice Brennan stated:
It [the right to a speedy trial] is intended to spare an accused those penalties
that may
and disabilties - incompatible with the presumption of innocence spring from delay in the criminal process.
Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 41 (1970) (concurring opinion). The speedy trial
clause protects societal interests, as well as those of the accused. See Ponzi v.
Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 264 (1922).
Consider also the real effect upon the accused:
In a very real sense, the extent to which he was prejudiced by the Government's delay is evidenced by the difficulty he encountered in establishing with
particularity the elements of that prejudice.
Ross v. United States, 349 F.2d 210, 215 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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harm through his uncontradicted testimony, at least in such circumstances
the Commonwealth should bear the burden of affirmatively proving the
absence of prejudice. 52 Moreover, the court's strong language with respect to due process and the elevation of the status of the speedy trial
right5" gives rise to the possible inference that an accused need merely
show a substantial delay to raise his prima facie case,5 4 thereby implying
that less may be required by an accused to shift the burden to the
Commonwealth.
The court considered another aspect of this case, and by way of
dicta appeared to repudiate the "demand doctrine." 55 Although the court
52. ___Pa. at _, 279 A.2d at 50.
53. See note 49 supra.

54. The court would, of course, be required to make a decision as to what

criteria would be used in deciding to which delays the safeguards apply. The court
could first look to the source of the delay, since a defendant cannot complain of
delays attributable to himself. See, e.g., United States v. Lustman, 258 F.2d 475, 477
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 880 (1958). Such a delay might be one resulting

from his own pretrial motions. See Osborne v. United States, 371 F.2d 913, 925-26
(9th Cir. 1967) ; United States v. McIntyre, 271 F. Supp. 991, 997 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) ;
State v. Barnes, 221 N.E.2d 482 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966). The defendant cannot
complain of delays due to his own incompetence to stand trial. See United States
v. Davis, 365 F.2d 251 (6th Cir. 1966); Howard v. United States, 261 F.2d 729
(5th Cir. 1958). Nor could the accused complain, as a general rule, of delays resulting
from such things as court procedure or congested dockets. See King v. United States,
265 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 998 (1959) ; Chinn v. United States,
228 F.2d 151 (4th Cir. 1955); McDonald v. Hudspeth, 113 F.2d 984 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 311 U.S. 683 (1940). The death of a trial judge is not the kind of
delay to which the safeguards should be applied. See United States v. Jackson,
369 F.2d 936 (4th Cir. 1966). A delay will generally violate the right to a.speedy trial
only if it was caused by those agencies of the Government responsible for bringing the
defendant to trial - the police and the prosecuting attorney. See Miller v. Rodriguez,
373 F.2d 26, 28 (10th Cir. 1967) ; State v. Patton, 260 N.C. 359, 364, 132 S.E.2d 891,
894 (1963) ; In re Norman's Petition, 184 A.2d 601 (Del. 1962).
Conversely, this would also require the court to decide whether a delay by
the Government is reasonable. Clearly a deliberate attempt by the Government to
use delay to harm the accused, or delay that is "purposeful or oppressive" is
unjustifiable. Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 361 (1957). An unnecessary
delay, whether intentional or negligent, is unreasonable since each is equally
damaging. Hanrahan v. United States, 348 F.2d 363, 368 (D.C. Cir. 1965); United
States v. Reed, 285 F. Supp. 738, 741 (D.D.C. 1968). However, a mistake by the
prosecution that could not reasonably have been avoided is excusable. See Miller v.
Rodriguez, 373 F.2d 26 (10th Cir. 1967) (six year delay attributable to the vacating
of defendant's previous sentence). See also United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116
(1966) (delay resulting from an unanticipated defect in indictment attributable to a
change in law) ; Allen v. State, 1 Md. App. 249, 229 A.2d 446 (1967) (three year
delay attributable to reversals of previous convictions). Therefore, the crucial
question in determining the legitimacy of the delay is whether it might reasonably
have been avoided, or whether it was necessary.
55. ____ Pa. at __, 279 A.2d at 46. The "demand doctrine" is a judicially
created rule which has been followed by a majority of both state and federal
jurisdictions. E.g., Bruce v. United States, 351 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1965) ; United
States v. Lustman, 258 F.2d 475 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 880 (1958);
United States v. Holmes, 168 F.2d 888 (3d Cir. 1948) ; Collins v. United States,
157 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1946). The doctrine requires some affirmative action on the
part of the accused, such as a request for a speedy trial or the resisting of a proposed
postponement. Thus, silence or inaction is deemed a waiver of the sixth amendment
right to a speedy trial. For a detailed discussion, see Note, Effective Guaranty of a
Speedy Trial for Convicts in Other Jurisdictions,77 YALE L.J. 767, 778-79 (1968);
Note, The Right to a Speedy Criminal Trial, 57 COLUm. L. REV. 846, 852-55 (1957);
Note, supra note 44, at 478-80. However, there has been some variance to the
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noted the considerable case law construing both Smith v. Hooey and
Dickey v. Florida to the narrow situation where the defendant unsuccessfully demands trial, it nevertheless labeled the doctrine as being "highly
suspect." 56 Clark expressed dissatisfaction with the rule, citing Justice
Brennan's concurring opinion in Dickey 7 which enunciated several of its
questionable aspects: "First, it rests on what may be an unrealistic understanding of the effect of delay."'5 s Mr. Justice Brennan stated that there
was a misconception that delay is always welcomed by a defendant, since
the purposes of the speedy trial guarantee as expressed in Ewell are
directly inconsistent with such an understanding.5 9 "Second, the equation
of silence or inaction with waiver is a fiction that has been categorically
rejected by this court when other fundamental rights are at stake."6 0
Therefore, it seems anomalous for the accused to be required to affirmatively act to preserve the right rather than to waive it. 61 "Third, it is
possible that the implication of waiver from silence or inaction misallocates the burden of ensuring a speedy trial. . . If a prosecutor fails to
do so, the defendant cannot be held to have waived his constitutional right
62
to a speedy trial."1
The Clark court found these shortcomings to be most disturbing,
stating however, that they need not decide them in the instant case, since
it was self-evident that such a rule is inapplicable to one who is unaware
of the pending charges against him.68 Thus, the court found petitioner
falling squarely within the well-recognized exceptions to the demand
doctrine as elucidated in Pitts v. North Carolina,64 where the restricting
factors of ignorance, imprisonment, and lack of counsel preclude the
65
need for a demand.
As a practical matter, the Pennsylvania supreme court's placement
of the burden upon the Commonwealth allocates it to the party with
superior resources available for insuring that the trial will be promptly
held. Additionally, the court has also created an incentive for the proseenforcement of the rule, and the doctrine's former dominance is being threatened.
E.g., Taylor v. United States, 238 F.2d 259 (D.C. Cir. 1956). The doctrine has
even been completely rejected by a minority of courts. State v. Maldonado, 92 Ariz.
70, 373 P.2d 583, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 928 (1962); State v. Hess, 180 Kan. 472,
304 P.2d 474 (1956); People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y. 353, 130 N.E.2d 891 (1955).
56. ___ Pa. at _ 279 A.2d at 46.
57. Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 49-51 (1969) (Brennan & Marshall, JJ.,
concurring).
58. 398 U.S. at 50.
59. __ Pa. at _-, 279 A.2d at 46.
60. 398 U.S. at 50-51.
61. Pa. at __, 279 U.S. at 46.
62. 398 U.S. at 51, citing United States v. Dillon, 183 F. Supp. 541, 543
(1960).
63. Id. at 47.
64. 395 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1968).
65. Pa. at _.., 279 A.2d at 47. Making its position even clearer, the court
stated :
Even assuming arguendo that the demand rule has any general merit, an
uncounseled failure to demand a trial upon unknown charges can scarcely be
viewed as a knowing and intelligent waiver of Sixth Amendment rights.
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cution to bring defendants imprisoned in other jurisdictions to trial
within a reasonable period of time, thus giving society a remedy for
inaction or dilatory practices by prosecutors. Moreover, since it is the
prosecution which is the party initiating the case against the criminal
defendant, it is submitted that the court's decision to place upon it the
burden of demonstrating the reasonableness of its priorities to the accused
is readily justifiable. The court apparently feels it patently unfair to
require the accused to suffer an abridgement of his constitutional right
to a speed trial simply because the prosecution does not deem criminal
justice deserving of additional financial investment.
Even though the importance of the Clark opinion lies within its
holding on the issue of burden of proof, the exceptionally strong dicta
which underscored the defects of the demand doctrine has in all probability repudiated this judicially created rule in Pennsylvania. Coupled
with the emphasis the court placed upon the classic definition of waiver of
a fundamental right which requires a knowing and intelligent relinquishment of that right, this dicta will have an extreme eroding effect upon the
doctrine should it survive the Clark opinion.
Allen M. Silk
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TRADE SECRETS
NOT

CONFLICT

-

17

PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRET AGREEMENTS DOES
WITH

THE

CONSTITUTIONAL

REQUIREMENTS

OF

FEDERAL PATENT POLICY.

Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc. (2d Cir. 1971)
Bourns, Inc., entered into a contract with Painton & Co., Ltd.,, whereby
Bourns was to supply the necessary engineering and manufacturing knowhow to Painton to enable the latter to manufacture worm gear or lead
screw actuated potentiometers. 2 Pursuant to that contract, all of the plans,
data and technical know-how received by Painton were to be maintained
as confidential information.3 Sometime during the life of the 1962 agreement,4 Bourns obtained a British patent. Four types of potentiometers
manufactured by Painton were said to have embodied features covered by
the patent. 5 On August 13, 1968, Bourns notified Painton of Bourns' intention to terminate the agreement in accordance with the contract terms.6
Painton reacted to this notice by filing a complaint on September 26, 1968,7
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
asserting that it had paid more than $340,000 for the material and drawings,
and was therefore entitled to their permanent retention and use. The
district judge, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Lear, Inc. v.
Adkins,8 decided that regardless of the construction of the 1962 contract,
the Court's decision in Lear prevented judicial enforcement of Bourns'
claims for trade secret protection, with respect to any models covered by
the British patent, until the validity of the patent should be upheld.,
The judge then made the broader holding that even as to models for
which Bourns had made no patent application, Painton was not required
1. Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971). The important
provisions of the contract are contained in the opinion of the court. Id. at 219.
2. Id. at 218. A potentiometer is an instrument used for the precise measurement of electromotive forces. A part of the voltage to be measured is balanced
against that of a known electromotive force, and then computed by the law of "fall
of potential." WEBSTER's NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1775 (3d ed. 1971).
3. 442 F.2d 220. Paragraph 19 of the agreement provides:
All of the plans, data, and technical know-how received by Painton under
this Agreement or previous agreements shall be deemed and maintained confidential
except information published in Bourns' catalogs.
4. There were two other contracts, one in 1958 and another in 1960. Both
of 'these earlier agreements were cancelled, and all claims under them were released
by paragraphs 1 and 2 of the 1962 agreement. Id. at 218.
5. Id. at 220.
6. Id. at 220. Paragraph 6 of the Agreement provides:
Unless otherwise terminated as herein provided, this Agreement shall terminate
at midnight October 24, 1968, California time. However, although this Agreement
may have been terminated, Painton shall pay the fees provided herein either
through termination date or for a four (4) year period after achieving a production rate of 500 pes. per month on any given model other than the "Flatpot,"
whichever date is later.
Id. at 219.
7. Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 2201, 1665 (1970).
8. 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
9. 309 F. Supp. at 273-74.
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to make any future payment of royalties' ° since enforcement of such an
agreement would be contrary to national patent law and policy as set forth
in Lear. Both parties appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, which reversed and relended, holding that the general
considerations of public policy and the federal patent law were not a sufficient basis for declining to enforce the royalty provisions of trade secret
agreements, at least with respect to those cases where no patent application
had been filed. Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971).

Article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution gives Congress
the power to grant patent protection for the purpose of promoting "the
Progress of Science and the useful Arts."" Pursuant to this authorization,
Congress has enacted the Patent Act, found in title 35 of the United States
Code.' 2 Under the Patent Act, an inventor receives an exclusive monopoly
13
on the subject matter of the patent for a period of seventeen years. In
10. Id. at 274. It should be noted that the parties did not argue these points

either in their briefs or at oral argument. The litigants were solely concerned with
the issue of contract interpretation. District Court Judge Motley made the rulings
discussed in the text, and then decided the question of contract construction as an
alternative ground. Her conclusion was that Painton could continue to use the
drawings and manufacture the unpatented potentiometers free of any trade secret
claim. 309 F. Supp. at 274. The circuit court concluded, after a rather lengthy
opinion, that the grant of summary judgment on this issue was in error, and determined
that it was ultimately a question of law foi" the court. Hence, the case was remanded.
442 F.2d at 235.
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 provides:
The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their Respective Writings and Discoveries.
12. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1970).
13. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1970), provides in pertinent part:
Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention and a grant to the
patentee, his heirs or assigns, for the term of seventeen years, subject to the
payment of issue fees as provided for in this title, of the right to exclude others
from making, using or selling the invention throughout the United States ...
One major problem with this system is that court determinations of the
subsequent invalidity of patents, after the patent has already issued to the inventor,
are notoriously high. On appeal, eighty per cent of all patent infringement actions
result in a holding that the patent sued upon is invalid. It should be noted, however,
that this figure does not represent the validity of all patents issued, but only those
whose validity is challenged and adjudicated. Milgrim, Sears to Lear to Painton:
Of Whales and Other Matters, 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 17, 31 (1971). See Mahon, Trade
Secrets and Patents Compared, 50 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 536, 540 (1968), where the
author states that decisions of the circuit courts in patent infringement suits for
the period January 1956 to March 1967 show that probability of success in such a
suit is only twenty-nine per cent. This places the inventor at a decided disadvantage
with the rest of the competition in that it leaves him without any protection. At 'the
same time, it makes his information a matter of public knowledge, because once a
patent has been declared invalid, the invention, which has become public knowledge
pursuant to the disclosure required by 35 U.S.C. §§ 111, 112 (1970), is open to
public use. The same result obtains when the patent expires. See United States
v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186-87 (1932), where it was stated:
[I]n consideration of its disclosure and the consequent benefit to the community,
the patent is granted. An exclusive enjoyment is guaranteed him for seventeen
years, but upon the expiration of that period, the knowledge of the invention
enures to the people, who are thus enabled without restriction to practice it
and profit by its use.
If the inventor knew that his idea was unpatentable, then he could maintain
its secrecy and elect to commercially utilize the fruits of his work through trade
secret licensing. Article I, section 8 of the Constitution says that the inventor
is not entitled to a monopoly unless he meets the requirements of the federal patent
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return, the inventor must give full disclosure of his new idea and strictly
comply with the exacting requirements of the Act. 14 At the end of the
seventeen year period, the subject matter of the patent becomes a part of
the public domain to be duplicated by whosoever desires. 15
Presaging the idea of patent protection, the common law had developed
the doctrine of trade secrets. 16 This doctrine is presently reflected in section 757 of the 1939 Restatement of Torts:
laws. By the same token an inventor is not required to put his invention into
public use. The Dubilier Court stated:
[A]n inventor deprives the public of nothing which it enjoyed before his discovery, but gives something of value to the community by adding to the sum
of human knowledge. . . .He may keep his invention secret and reap its fruits
indefinitely.
289 U.S. at 186. See also 4 A. DELLER, WALKER ON PATENTS, § 206, at 3 (2d ed.
1965), quoted in Thomson Mach. Co. v. La Rose, 306 F. Supp. 681, 694-95 (E.D.
La. 1969). It would therefore seem equitable that an inventor should have the means
by which he can determine what he wants to do with his invention before it becomes
a matter of public knowledge.
14. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (1970).
15. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1970). This section provides:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of
the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains,
or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and
shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out
his invention.
See E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904, 911 (Ct. Cl.
1961), where Chief Judge Jones, speaking for the court, stated:
Information contained in a patent is public, widely distributed, and generally
known by those interested in a particular art. Inevitably the patented idea
becomes common knowledge ....
16. For an extensive history of the development of the law of trade secrets
in both England and the United States, see Orenbuch, Trade Secrets and the Patent
Laws, 52 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 638 (1970). The author traces the development of
trade secret law in England starting with the cases of Newbery v. James, 2 Meriv.
446 (1817) and Williams v. Williams, 3 Meriv. 157 (1817), in which Lord Eldon
refused to aid the courts in preserving unpatented trade secrets, since to do such
would be inconsistent with the public's right to the free use of an invention which is
not protected by a patent. The author cites Morison v. Moat, 9 Hare 241, 20 L.J. Ch.
513 (1851), as being the leading case recognizing a legally protectable interest
in a trade secret. Morison and Moat were partners in a firm which prepared and
dispensed medicines. Morison disclosed the recipe for the medicines to Moat with
the understanding that the information be maintained as secret. The sons of both
partners were in the employ of the firm. After the death of both partners, Moat's
son founded his own business and started to sell medicines derived from the trade
secret. The chancery court granted an injunction to restrain Moat's son from
using the trade secret. On appeal, the court held that "[w]hen a party who has
a secret in a trade employs persons under contract, expressed or implied, or under
duty expressed or implied, those persons cannot gain knowledge of the secret and
then set it up against the employer . .

. ."

Morison v. Moat, 21 L.J. Ch. 248, 249

(1852), quoted in Orenbuch, supra at 643-44. The author cites Peabody v. Norfolk,
98 Mass. 452 (1868), as being the case which established a precedent in the United
States for the recognition by state courts of "property" rights in a protectable trade
secret. Orenbuch, supra at 646. Peabody employed Norfolk under a contract by
which Norfolk agreed to maintain as secret the information he acquired while
working for Peabody. Norfolk was subsequently hired by a third party who had
notice of this previous agreement. The court held that it would enforce the original
agreement between Peabody and Norfolk, and grant an injunction to restrain the
third party from obtaining trade secrets from Norfolk. 98 Mass. at 461. Out of this
decision grew an extensive body of case law on the subject of trade secret protection,
culminating in the Supreme Court decision of Lear v. Adkins. Orenbuch, supra at

644-46.
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One who discloses or uses another's trade secret, without a privilege
to do so, is liable to the other if
(a) he discovered the trade secret by improper means, or (b) his
disclosure or use constitutes a breach of confidence reposed in him by
the other in disclosing the secret to him, or (c) he learned the secret
from a third person with notice of the facts that it was a secret and
that the third person discovered it by improper means or that the
third person's disclosure of it was otherwise a breach of his duty to
it
the other, or (d) he learned the secret with notice of the facts that
17
was a secret and that its disclosure was made to him by mistake.
This section enunciates a rule limiting the right of the public to copy, when
that which is copied is a trade secret.' 8 In the words of the American Law
Institute, "[i]t is the employment of improper means to procure the trade
secret, rather than the mere copying or use, which is the basis of the
liability ....
"19
17. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939). See also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
§§ 756 to 761 (1939). The American Law Institute has not as yet redrafted these

and other cited sections of the 1939 Restatement. The Second Restatement, as
adopted in final form by the Institute, only covers to section 503. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 1 to 503 (1965). Moreover, the trade secret sections of the
1939 Restatement have not been treated at all, even in tentative draft form. Tentative
Draft No. 14, which would presumably touch upon these cited sections, stops with
section 707A, and begins again with section 766. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
(Tent. Draft No. 14, 1969).
18. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment b at 2-3 (1939). See Aktiebolaget
Bofors v. United States, 194 F.2d 145, 147-48 (D.C. Cir. 1951). See also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 742, 743 (1939).
The other limitations are the patent laws and the law of unfair competition
which prohibit copying in a manner which creates in the market avoidable confusion
of the commercial source. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment a at 3. See also
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 741 (1939), which states:
One who markets goods, the physical appearance of which is a copy or imitation
of the physical appearance of the goods of which another is the initial distributor,
markets them with an unprivileged imitation, under the rule stated in § 711, if his
goods are of the same class as those of the other and are sold in a market in
which the other's interest is protected, and (a) he copied or imitated the
appearance after obtaining access to or procuring the goods, or their labels,
wrappers, containers, styles or designs, by improper means or on his promise
not to copy or imitate them, or (b) the copied or imitated feature has acquired
generally in the market a special significance identifying the other's goods, and
(i) the copy or imitation is likely to cause prospective purchasers to regard
his goods as those of the other, and (ii) the copied or imitated feature is nonfunctional, or, if it is functional, he does not take reasonable steps to inform
prospective purchasers that the goods which he markets are not those of
the other.
However, it should be noted that this section of the Restatement, to a greater or
lesser extent, has been modified by the Sears and Compco holdings. Sears, Roebuck
& Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) ; Compco Corp., v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,
376 U.S. 234 (1964). It was a majority's position in these cases that a state
could not invoke the trade secret doctrine in a way which would prohibit other
people from copying the article, unless the particular article under inspection had
met the requirements of the Patent Act. While the courts would permit a state
to make laws requiring proper labeling or identification so as to avoid consumer
confusion as to the item's manufacture, any law which prohibited the actual copying
would be invalid as being in conflict with federal patent policy. See notes 31-34 and
accompanying text infra.
19. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment a at 3-4 (1939). See Aktiebolaget
Bofors v. United States, 194 F.2d 145, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Monolith Portland
Midwest Co. v. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp., 267 F. Supp. 726, 730-32 (S.D. Cal.
1967), aff'd, 407 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1969).
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The standards governing what may warrant protection as a trade
secret are not so exacting as those for patents.2 0 For example, in order to
obtain a patent, the invention must have the qualities of nonobviousness,
novelty and utility. 2 1 All that need be shown for the enforcement of a trade
secret is: (1) the information or device is in fact a secret,22 that is, not a
matter of public knowledge; (2) there is some degree of novelty, 23 although

it may fall considerably short of that required for a patent;24 and (3)
there has been a wrongful appropriation of the trade secret, usually, but
25
not necessarily resulting from a breach of an obligation not to disclose.
2
6
Without such a misappropriation, there can be no redress. Unlike patent
requirements, a trade secret may be a device or process whose novelty is
clearly anticipated by the prior art in the field. 27 Novelty and nonobviousness, as used in the Patent Act, are not requisites for a trade secret.28
20. R. MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS § 8.02, at 5, 8-7 (1970).
21. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (1970).
22. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment b at 5, 6 (1939). See Cataphote
Corp. v. Hudson, 422 F.2d 1290 (5th Cir. 1970); Aktiebolaget Bofors v. United
States, 194 F.2d 145-47 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Thomson Mach. Co. v. La Rose, 306
F. Supp. 681, 695 (E.D. La. 1969) ; Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v. Kaiser Alum.
& Chem. Corp., 267 F. Supp. 726, 731 (S.D. Cal. 1967), aff'd, 407 F.2d 288 (9th Cir.
1969) ; Town & Country House & Homes Serv. v. Evans, 150 Conn. 349, 189 A.2d 390
(1963).

23.

§ 757, comment b at 6, 7 (1939). See A. 0. Smith

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS

Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531, 538-39 (6th Cir. 1934); Monolith
Portland Midwest Co. v. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp., 267 F. Supp. 726, 731
(S.D. Cal. 1967), aff'd, 407 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1969).

24.

RESTATEMENT

OF TORTS

§ 757, comment b at 6, 7 (1939).

See Cataphote

Corp. v. Hudson, 422 F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (5th Cir. 1970); Monolith Portland
Midwest Co. v. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp., 267 F. Supp. 726, 731 (S.D. Cal.
1967), aff'd, 407 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1969) ; Berry v. Glidden Co., 92 F. Supp. 909, 913
(S.D.N.Y. 1950). See also Atlantic Wool Combing Co. v. Norfolk Mills, Inc.,
357 F.2d 866, 870 (1st Cir. 1966) (Judge Hastie cites with approval RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS § 757, comment b at 6, 7 (1939)).

25.
26.

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939).
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment

c at 8, 9 (1939).

See Thomson

Mach. Co. v. La Rose, 306 F. Supp. 681, 695 (E.D. La. 1969) ; Monolith Portland
Midwest Co. v. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp., 267 F. Supp. 726 (S.D. Cal. 1967),
aff'd, 407 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1969); Gilbert v. General Motors Corp., 32 F. Supp.
502, 504 (W.D.N.Y. 1940).

27.

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS

§ 757, comment b at 6, 7 (1939).

28. Id. The law of trade secrets has, in the past, acted as an alternative to the
federal patent laws, affording inventors an alternative means for protecting their
creative ideas and works. This alternative was usually followed when the inventor
thought his discovery would fail to meet the requirements of the Act. 84 HARV.
L. REV. 477, 480 (1970).
In this way the inventor could assure himself of a
competitive "headstart" over other competition, necessary in order to recoup the
expenses of his research and development since a patent was unobtainable. To deny
the "headstart" to the inventor or his licensee may tend to frustrate or discourage
experimentation in areas where the discoveries would not meet the requirements
of the federal patent laws. Such an argument may be answered by saying that
experimentation would not be frustrated since companies would still encourage
experimentation if their business needs required it. The mere fact that potential
inventions would not be protected from copying does not necessarily mean business
would curtail or extinguish experimentation if this were the only method by which
a company could meet its competitive requirements. For a discussion of the "headstart"
theory and how it relates to cases dealing with trade secrets, see Comment, The
Viability of Trade Secret Protection After Lear v. Adkins, 16 VILL. L. REV. 551,
563-66 (1971).
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The types of protections afforded an owner against the disclosure of
his trade secret may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 29 In some states,
protection is afforded by unfair competition laws. 30 Until recently, inventors
of less than patentable items have found such protection. Then, in 1964,
the Supreme Court decided the companion cases of Sears, Roebuck & Co.
V. Stiffel Co. 31 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,32 in which

Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the majority, held that the use of a state
unfair competition law 33 to give relief against the copying of an unpatented
29. For a listing of states which provide for both civil and criminal protection
of trade secrets, and a discussion thereof, see R. MILGRIM, supra note 20, §§ 1.09, 1.10
(1971). In reference to criminal proceedings as a basis for protection of trade

secrets, see Fetterley, Historical Perspectives on Criminal Laws Relating to the
Theft of Trade Secrets, 25 Bus. LAW. 1535 (1970) ; Fromson, The Safeguarding of
Trade Secrets, 14 NASSAU LAW. 17, 18-21 (June 1967). A discussion of the requirments needed for judicial protection of trade secrets may be found in R. MILGRIM,
supra note 20, §§ 8.02[8], 8.03. For a listing of states which recognize the possessor
of a trade secret as having a property right in it, see R. MILGRIM, supra note 20,
§ 1.01[21 n.15. For a listing of states which permit a possessor of a trade secret
to protect against disclosure by operation of an express contract, see R. MILGRIM,
supra note 20, § 3.01 n.3. For a discussion of the protection of trade secrets by operation of law, see R. MILGRIM, supra note 20, §§ 4.01, 4.02, 4.03. An example of a
criminal statute concerning trade secrets is the New York Penal Law Section 1296,
which states:
§ 1296. Grand larceny in second degree
A person is guilty of grand larceny in the second degree who, under
circumstances not amounting to grand larceny in the first degree, in any manner
specified in this article, steals or unlawfully obtains or appropriates:
4. Property of any value consisting of a sample, culture, micro-organism,
specimen, record, recording, document, drawing or any other article, material,
device or substance which constitutes, represents, evidences, reflects, or records
a secret scientific or technical process, invention or formula or any phase or part
thereof. A process, invention or formula is "secret" when it is not, and is not
intended to be available to anyone other than the owner thereof or selected
persons having access thereto for limited purposes with his consent, and when
it accords or may accord the owner an advantage over competitors or other
persons who do not have knowledge or the benefit thereof.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1296 (McKinney 1967), quoted in R. MILGRIM, supra note 20,
§ 1.10[1] [a].
30. The basis of the law of unfair competition is the prevention of dealings
founded upon deceit and dishonesty, and the promotion of business integrity and fair
competition. The doctrine has the threefold purpose of: (1) protecting the honest
trader; (2) punishing the wrongdoer; and (3) protecting the public from deception.
What constitutes unfair competition in a given case is governed by its own
particular facts and circumstances. J. CALIMAFDE, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 6.01 to 6.07 (1970).
See also 1 CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND
TRADE-MARKS

55-67 (2d ed. 1950).

31. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
32. Id. at 234.
33. Both cases dealt with the unfair competition law of Illinois which prohibited
the copying of articles which were not protected by patents or copyrights. The law
is based on the principle that one is not allowed to confuse the public as to the
source of the article which is on the market for sale. Both suits, alleging patent
infringement and unfair competition, were initiated in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The district court held the patents
invalid, but granted relief on the theory of unfair competition. The court of appeals
affirmed both the invalidity of the patent and the finding of unfair competition,
reasoning that the public would be misled as to the source of the Sears' product
because of the similarity of the two. Stiffel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 115
(7th Cir. 1963). The opinion of the district court is unreported. For a discussion
of the Stiffel case and its effect on the law of trade secrets, see Note, The Stiffel
Doctrine and the Law of Trade Secrets, 62 Nw. U.L. REv. 956 (1968). See also
Kestenbaum, The Sears and Compco Cases: A Federal Right to Compete by Copying,
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industrial design conflicts with the federal patent laws and policy. 4 It was
Mr. Justice Black's position that an inventor is only entitled to protection
when the invention has met the exacting requirements of the Patent Act.
Five years later, the Supreme Court decided Lear, Inc. v. Adkins. a8
In Lear, Adkins had contracted with Lear for the manufacturing of
gyros which Adkins had developed. 0 It took almost six years for Adkins
to obtain a patent, but before its issuance, Lear stopped payment of the
royalties. The Court, in overturning a long line of precedent,3 7 held that
the licensee was not estopped from attacking the validity of his licensor's
patent.38 The Court left unanswered the issue of whether a contractual
obligation to pay royalties on unpatented inventions is enforceable.3 9 However, in his dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Black stated:
[N]o state has a right to authorize any kind of monopoly on what is
claimed to be a new invention, except when a patent has been obtained
from the Patent Office under the exacting standards of the patent
40
laws.
Thus, it can be seen that Justice Black's position is "that trade secret
protection is totally incompatible with federal patent policy.' '41 It was in
light of this background that the case of Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc. 42
was decided by the district court.
The district court based its decision, with respect to the issue of
federal patent policy, upon two different legal theories. 48 The first stems
51 A.B.A.J. 935 (1965) ; Treece, Patent Policy and Preemption: The Stiffel and
Compco Cases, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 80 (1964); Comment, Does Stiffel Stifle the
Law of Unfair Competition?, 37 U. COLO. L. REv. 86 (1964) ; Note, Unfair Competition Protection After Sears and Compco, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 101 (1965); Note,
To What Extent Has Federal Patent and Copyright Law Preempted State Protection
of Trade Values? - The Sears and Compco Cases, 1965 U. ILL. L.F. 83 (1965).

34. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232-33 (1964).

35. 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
36. Adkins, an engineer and inventor, was hired in 1952 to help solve problems
in developing a gyroscope. They agreed that new inventions, ideas and discoveries
would become the property of Adkins and that he would grant Lear a license to all
ideas he might develop "on a mutually satisfactory royalty basis." 395 U.S. at 653.
37. See, e.g., Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S.
827 (1950); United States v. Harvey Steel Co., 196 U.S. 310 (1905); Kinsman
v. Parkhurst, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 289 (1856).
38. The principle which the Lear Court overturned was known as "licensee
estoppel." Under this doctrine, a licensee who had contracted to pay royalties was
estopped from challenging the validity of his licensor's patent. The Lear Court then
held that there was no duty to pay royalties for the period subsequent to the patent
grant but preceding the declaration of invalidity. However, Lear did not decide
whether the licensee was required to pay royalties for the know-how licensing for

the time period before the grant of the patent. 395 U.S. at 674-75. For a discussion
of the impact of the Lear decision upon the law of trade secret protection, see Comment,

supra note 28. See also Treece, Licensee Estoppel in Patent and Trademark Cases,
53 IowA L. Rav. 525 (1967) ; Comment, The "Decent Public Burial" of the Doctrine
of Patent Licensee Estoppel, 11 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. Rav. 517 (1970); Comment,
"Decent Burial" of Patent Licensee Estoppel, 1970 DUKE L.J. 375.

39. 395 U.S. at 675.
40. Id. at 677 (Black, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice
Douglas joined in the dissent.
41. See Comment, supra note 28, at 557.
42. 309 F. Supp. 271 (1970).
43. Id. at 273-74.
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from the cases of Sears and Compco and Justice Black's dissent in Lear,
while the second was concerned with the public policy consideration of
encouraging patent applications. Justice Black argued that state recognition
of agreements which required payments for trade secrets would run counter to the holdings of Sears and CoMpco. 4 Those cases held that state
laws prohibiting the manufacture of articles not protected by valid patents
or copyrights, but offered for public sale, were inconsistent with federal
patent policy. 45 In Sears and Compco, the inconsistency was rooted in the
fact that under federal patent policy the public is allowed to copy any article
which fails to qualify for a patent, for which the patent has expired, or for
which the patent has been judicially declared invalid. By invoking state
law of unfair competition to prohibit copying, the state courts limited a
right conferred on the public by the federal patent laws. 46 Whenever such
a conflict arises, the supremacy clause of the Constitution requires that the
47
federal laws pre-empt those of the states.
The circuit court distinguished these two cases from Painton, reasoning that the Illinois law, by prohibiting the copying of the unpatented
articles, actually conferred monopolies on articles which could otherwise
be copied by any member of the public. 48 The Illinois law prohibited anyone
from copying an article if consumer confusion as to its source of origin
would ensue. 49 Therefore, the maker of the article actually gained a
monopoly on the article which he would not have been able to otherwise
receive. 50 As Mr. Justice Black suggested in Sears, the Illinois law, if
left standing, would have granted protection similar to patents and copyrights, but free from the safeguards and limits of time.51 However, the
circuit court distinguished the above rationale from the present case:
An agreement licensing a trade secret is an altogether different matter.
[I]t binds no one except the licensee, while all others are free . . .
to attempt by fair means to figure out what the secret is and, if they
succeed, to practice it.52
In this way, the circuit court concluded that there is quite a difference in
saying on the one hand, as did Mr. Justice Black, that a state cannot enjoin
the copying of an unpatented article, and saying, on the other, that individuals cannot enter into contractual agreements which in no way preclude
a third party from independently discovering and developing the article.5 3
44. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 676-77 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting).
45. 442 F.2d at 223. See notes 33 & 34 and accompanying text supra.
46. See Treece, supra note 33, at 81.
47. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.

48. 442 F.2d at 223.
49. See note 30 supra.
50. Actually, the so-called "monopoly" conferred by the unfair competition laws

is less extensive than a patent monopoly. Under the former, copying would be

allowed to continue so long as it is properly labeled and does not confuse the public

as to its source. See Doerfer, The Limits on Trade Secret Law Imposed by Federal
Patent and Antitrust Supremacy, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1432, 1447-48 (1967).
51. 376 U.S. at 231-32.
52. 442 F.2d at 223.
53. Id. at 223. See Milgrim, supra note 13, at 25 n.34.
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At least one writer has argued that upon close analysis it can be seen
that judicial enforcement of private trade secret agreements actually has
an anti-monopolistic effect. 54 One of the reasons for the district court's
decision in Painton is reflected by Justice Black's dissent in Lear, in which
he stated:
The national policy expressed in the patent laws, favoring free competition and narrowly limiting monopoly, cannot be frustrated by private
agreements among individuals, with or without the approval of the
State. 55
It follows from such reasoning that there could be no judicial enforcement of trade secret agreements, at least with respect to those where no
patent application had been filed. What this rationale overlooks is the
fact that there are many discoveries which, because of the exacting standards
of the patent laws, are not patentable, because they either lack novelty or
utility or were anticipated by the prior art in the field. 56 It is in this situation that know-how licensing plays an important role. Had the decision
of the district court in Painton been upheld, inventors would be forced
to seek patent protection, since this would be the only way by which the
inventor could be assured of compensation for his time and effort. However, it is submitted that the result of upholding this rationale would be
to destroy the experimental incentive of inventors with less than patentable
discoveries, since all means by which they receive compensation for their
efforts would be eliminated. If an inventor did not have the facilities for
utilizing or manufacturing his own trade secret, then there would be no
reason for such person to experiment since there would be no way for
him to receive payment for the disclosure of his secret. If, on the other
hand, an inventor did have such facilities, presumably he would attempt
to keep an exclusive monopoly for himself and not disclose his discovery
to anyone else; non-disclosure would be the only way by which he could
be adequately remunerated for his time and effort. This would have the
practical effect of either discouraging inventors from further research and
development, in the case of non-manufacturing inventors, or keeping their
know-how to themselves, in the case of those who do have manufacturing
facilities. Clearly, both of these alternatives run counter to the policy
considerations behind article I, section 8 of the Constitution, which encourages invention and public disclosure thereof in an effort to maximize
57
the advance of the sciences.
54. See 84 HARV. L. REV. 477, 484 (1970), where the author posits:
[W]hen the inventor is able to license there is an antimonopolistic effect in that
there are incentives to spread know-how rather than to hoard it.
55. 395 U.S. at 677.
56. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (1970).

57. See Doerfer, supra note 50, at 1440-47. The patent system promotes the

progress of science by providing economic incentives and encouraging the disclosure
of new inventions. This system proceeds on the premise that circulation of new data
and information stimulates more ideas.
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The second legal theory upon which the district court based its decision
was that the protection of trade secrets in advance of the filing of patent
58
applications is against public policy since it discourages such applications.
This reasoning was based upon the impact of Lear which held that a
licensor cannot demand the payment of royalties from a licensee who
contests the validity of the patent until such time as the patent is adjudged
60
valid. 59 Since Lear did away with the doctrine of licensee estoppel,
inventors will turn toward the use of trade secrets if they are held to
be enforceable, rather than apply for a patent and face the risk of having
their licensee challenge its validity."1 The district court thought that this
use of trade secrets would effectively deprive the public of learning of
the invention. 62 Thus, the main objections to this practice focus upon the
element of non-disclosure and the possibility of the inventor possessing a
perpetual monopoly. 63 Furthermore, the absence of a means for compulsory disclosure could result in an inventor dying with his secret, thereby
forever depriving the public of the knowledge and usefulness of his
64
invention.
The circuit court dismissed this argument, perhaps too summarily, by
distinguishing between three categories of potential trade secret licensors:
(1) the owner of a trade secret which is believed to be a validly patentable
invention; (2) the owner of a trade secret which is not patentable; and
35
(3) the owner of a trade secret whose patentability is considered dubious.
With respect to the first category, the Second Circuit stated that there
66
This reawould be no substantial withholding of patent applications.
so much
pay
not
would
soning is based on the premise that a licensee
therefore,
and
for a trade secret license as he would for a patent license,
Although this
most inventors will continue to seek patent protection.
may be true in some instances, for example where the reverse engineering
68
of an article would be relatively easy, it is questionable whether this
309 F. Supp. at 274.
395 U.S. at 674.
See note 38 supra.
309 F. Supp. at 274. See 48 TEXAS L. REv. 1399, 1401 (1970).
309 F. Supp. at 274.
63. 48 TEXAS L. REV. 1399, 1401-02 (1970).
64. See Comment, supra note 28, at 556. According to the author, there are
only three ways in which a trade secret may be disclosed absent independent discovery
by a third party: (1) by the issuance of a patent, in which case the trade secret
becomes public knowledge at the time the patent issues; (2) upon marketing, if the
trade secret is susceptible of reverse engineering (see note 68 infra) ; and (3) by
misappropriation, in which case the owner of the trade secret has a remedy against
the person who has misappropriated it. But see 48 TEXAS L. REV. 1399, 1402 (1970),
in which the author suggests that trade secrets are likely to become obsolete within
a few years because of independent discovery. See also Klein, The Technical Trade
Secret Quadrangle: A Survey, 55 Nw. U.L. REV. 437, 455 (1960).
65. 442 F.2d at 224.
66. Id. at 224.
67. Id.
68. Reverse engineering is the technique of learning how to copy another's
product by starting out with the finished product and working backward until each
step of the manufacturing process is discovered. 48 TEXAs L. REv. 1399, 1401 n.13
(1970).
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
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would be true in a majority of cases. Illustrative of the validity of this
conclusion is the invention of a new process or method of making an
article which would not be susceptible to discovery upon an examination
of the final product. Such a process may not be discoverable unless the
inventor wishes to disclose it, and could possibly remain his secret forever,
thereby giving him, for all practical purposes, a monopoly in perpetuity.
A patent, on the other hand, would only give him a monopoly for seventeen years. If the trade secret is of this nature, then a potential licensee
may pay the same for a license as he would if the process were patented,
so long as he believes that the potential longevity of the trade secret will
be sufficient for his purposes.6 9 In other words, the price any licensee
will pay for a trade secret license is a function of the nature of the invention and the estimated time period for which the secrecy can be
maintained before independent discovery.
The circuit court points out several other reasons why it would be
to an inventor's detriment to refrain from obtaining a patent where one
could validly be obtained.7 0 One of these reasons is that the secret may
leak, or be leaked in a way that could not be proved to be a breach of
the agreement. If this happened, the inventor would be missing one of
the necessary requirements needed for invoking trade secret protection,
namely, a showing that there has been a wrongful appropriation of the
71
trade secret, usually resulting from breach of a fiduciary relationship.
In this situation, the inventor would be left with no means for protecting
his trade secret. Another reason for choosing patent protection over trade
secret protection is that an inventor may forfeit his right to obtain a patent
if he does not apply for it within a year after the invention was first
publicly used or sold.7 2 The inventor may also lose protection if a
subsequent inventor is able to show that the former suppressed or con73
cealed the discovery.
The second category which the circuit court discussed is that in
which the owner knows the trade secret is unpatentable. There is a great
deal of know-how which lacks the sufficient utility, novelty or nonobviousness to be patentable.74 To deny enforcement to trade secret agreements
in such instances can only result in one of two equally undesirable alternatives. The first would be the flooding of an already overburdened patent
office with frivolous applications for which no patents could be granted, 75
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See note 28 supra.
442 F.2d at 224.
See notes 25 & 26 and accompanying text supra.
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1970).
35 U.S.C. § 102(9) (1970).
442 F.2d at 224.

75. Id. at 224. The court does not say why it believes a person who knows his
invention is not patentable would still attempt to have a patent granted. It would

appear that if a person knew his invention would not meet the requirements of the
Patent Act, then he would not go to the trouble and expense of applying for one.
Perhaps if a patent were the only means of protection available, then the inventor
would apply for it since he has nothing substantial to lose and since the information
will not become public until the patent is issued. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1970).
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since there would be no alternative method by which an inventor could
hope to receive compensation for his efforts. The inventor would stand
to lose nothing if the patent were refused, since there is no disclosure
until the patent issues. 76 The second alternative would be a decline in
research and experimentation in those areas of know-how which, if a
process were developed, would not amount to a patentable idea, since the
inventors of such know-how would not receive compensation for their
expended money and efforts. This diminution of innovative effort would
be contrary to the public interest in that it would inhibit the advance of
technology. 77 If, however, trade secret agreements are upheld, these inventors would be afforded an alternative means of protection, thereby
encouraging the creative incentive of those with less than patentable ideas.
The third category discussed by the Second Circuit is that in which
the owner of a trade secret is doubtful or unsure of whether his idea is
patentable. In such instances, the circuit court admits that a rule denying
the enforcement of trade secrets would have the effect of stimulating
patent applications where they might not otherwise be forthcoming, since
the owner would attempt to receive the only means of protection which
would be available to him.78 However, the court questions the beneficial
effect of such a measure:
If the patent does not issue, there will have been an unnecessary postponement in the divulging of the trade secret to persons willing to pay
for it. If it does, it may well be invalid, yet many will prefer to pay
a modest royalty than to contest it . . .79
The advantages in upholding trade secret agreements in this category
would be the same as those discussed for owners who know that their
ideas are not patentable. Thus, with another means of protection available
to the inventor, he would be more inclined to pursue the experimentation
which ultimately leads to the advance of technology, thereby benefiting
the public interest.
The court concludes its considerations by stating:
We therefore do not find, either in general considerations of public
policy or in emanations from the federal patent law, a sufficient basis
for declining to enforce even the royalty provisions of trade secret
agreements at least with respect to cases where no patent application
has been filed.80
Thus, it seems clear that trade secret agreements remain a viable means of
protection for inventors who choose this alternative over that of the patent
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

35 U.S.C. § 122 (1970).
See p. 384 supra.
442 F.2d at 225.
Id.
Id.
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system. The circuit court distinguishes the opinions of Mr. Justice Black
in Sears and Compco, and flatly rejects his dissent in Lear:
Whatever the impact of Lear may be with respect to agreements
governing inventions for which patent applications have been filed, we
find no suggestion in the opinion that the Court intended to cast
doubt on the longstanding principle that an inventor who chooses to
exploit his invention by private arrangements is entirely free to do so,
though in so doing he may thereby forfeit his right to a patent. 81
This language of the court clearly demonstrates a willingness to enforce
trade secret agreements which will undoubtedly continue until this issue
82
is more fully considered by the Supreme Court.
It is submitted that the advantages of enforcing trade secret agreements far outweigh any disadvantages. As was already pointed out, it
most definitely encourages research and development in areas where a
patent would not be obtainable. 88 Its necessity can also be seen in other
areas, such as the employer-employee relationship. 84 Without the enforcement of trade secrets in this area, the temptation for people to resort to
inequitable and unscrupulous business practices may prove too great to
resist. Employees could work for employers, learn the secrets, then use
them to their own advantage.8 5
One of the main objections to trade secret agreements seems to lie
in the possibility of allowing the owner a perpetual monopoly, thereby
conflicting with the federal patent laws. However, a closer study shows
that the exclusionary rights which are conferred upon an owner by trade
secret laws are not coextensive with those conferred by the patent laws. 80
Since third parties are allowed to attempt independent discovery by fair
means, and use it if successful, the trade secret laws are aimed at pro81. Id. at 225. The reason the court talks about forfeiting the right to a patent

is that under the patent laws an owner or inventor of an invention loses his right
to apply for and obtain a patent if he markets his invention more than one year
prior to making application. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1970).
82. It is of interest to note that aside from Painton and the case of Epstein
v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 314 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), there have been no recent
trade secret cases which have considered the Lear decision. In Epstein, Judge Motley
did not find it necessary to decide if Lear modified the law of trade secrets, and, in
fact, recognized that a right of recovery could conceivably exist. 314 F. Supp. at 125.
83. See p. 384 supra.
84. For a discussion of trade secret agreements and how they relate to the
employer-employee relationship, see Doerfer, supra note 50, at 1435-36. See also
Comment, supra note 28, at 561-63. It should be noted that most trade secret cases
arise out of a breach of confidence by an employee under an express or implied
contract not to disclose or compete. See Blake, Employee Agreements Not To
Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1960); Leydig, Protecting Trade Secrets When
Employees Move, 21 Bus. LAW. 325, 329 (1966). Covenants prohibiting disclosure
of secret information in such situations have been upheld without question. See
Hunter v. Shell Oil Co., 198 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1960) ; Kelite Corp. v. Khem Chems.,
Inc., 162 F. Supp. 332 (N.D. Ill. 1958). To decline to enforce trade secret agreements
in this area could only lead to chaos and confusion.
85. See Cataphote Corp. v. Hudson, 422 F.2d 1290 (5th Cir. 1970) ; E. I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. American Potash & Chem. Corp., 41 Del. Ch. 533,
200 A.2d 428 (1969).
86. See Doerfer, supra note 50, at 1447-48.
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tecting the contractual relationship of the parties, more so than protecting
the monopoly of the owner. Perhaps this objection could be resolved by
limiting the number of years during which a trade secret will be granted
protection. Perhaps the answer lies in a reorganization of the rigid patent
laws which presently exist. Whatever alternative is adopted, it should
be remembered that by declining to enforce trade secret agreements, courts
go against one of the fundamental rights of contract law, namely, the
freedom of parties to contract. The trade secret law exists separate from
federal patent policy and covers matters which are frequently unpatentable.
It grants protection only against wrongful use or disclosure, while at the
same time it encourages multiple independent invention. Any possible
conflicts with patent law should be resolved in such a way as to retain the
viability of trade secret law.
William F. Holsten

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol17/iss2/5

54

